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ANTITRUST OVERREACH: UNDOING
COOPERATIVE STANDARDIZATION IN THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY
Jonathan M. Barnett*

Abstract
Information technology markets in general, and wireless
communications markets in particular, rely on standardization
mechanisms to develop interoperable devices for data processing,
storage and transmission. From 2G through the emergent 5G
standard, wireless communications markets have largely achieved
standardization through cooperative multi-firm arrangements that
likely outperform the historically dominant alternatives of government
monopoly, which is subject to informational deficits and regulatory
capture, and private monopoly, which suffers from pricing and other
distortions inherent to protected market positions. This cooperative
process has successfully relied on three key legal elements: reasonably
secure patents, quasi-contractual licensing commitments supplemented
by reputation effects, and targeted application of antitrust safeguards
against collusion risk. Over approximately the past decade, antitrust
agencies and courts in the U.S., Europe and Asia have taken actions
that threaten this legal infrastructure by limiting patentees’ ability to
seek injunctive relief, adopting rigid understandings of “fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory” licensing principles, and
addressing collusion risk among licensors-innovators while
overlooking (and even exacerbating) collusion risk among licenseesimplementers. These judicial and regulatory interventions in IP
licensing markets shift value from firms and economies that specialize
in generating innovations to firms and economies that specialize in
integrating innovations into end-user products. These entity-level and
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country-level redistributive effects are illustrated by lobbying activities
in the wireless communications markets and antitrust actions against
IP licensors in jurisdictions that have substantial net IP deficits and
are principally populated by IP licensees. Current antitrust policy
promotes producers’ narrow interests in lower input costs while
ignoring the broader public interest in preserving the cooperative
standardization structures that have supported innovation and
commercialization in the digital economy.
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Introduction
Modern information and communications technology (“ICT”) markets
depend on standardization and interoperability to achieve the scale economies, communication efficiencies and network effects that have generated
radical reductions in user-to-user, business-to-business, and business-to-user
transactions. The low-cost, high-quality transmission of data among individuals and entities using Apple iPhones, Samsung Galaxy smartphones,
Dell laptops, and Amazon tablets relies on the institutional “plumbing” supplied by the organizational and contractual arrangements that drive market
standardization. The growth of standard-dependent technology markets is
remarkable. On a worldwide basis, unit shipments in the smartphone industry grew from 123.9 million in 2007 to 1.47 billion in 2017 while the total
1
value of shipments grew from $52 billion in 2007 to $452 billion in 2015.
These figures will undoubtedly expand as the 5G network and associated
“Internet of Things” are deployed by device makers and telecommunications carriers in household, business and industrial environments. The
emerging 5G environment follows the successful implementation of the
2G/GSM, 3G/UMTS and 4G/LTE standards over a period of almost three
decades starting with the commercial launch of a 2G/GSM network in
2
1991. The 5G network will comprise data exchange not only between indi3
viduals but also between devices , thereby bolstering the necessity to main-

1.
Jason Dedrick & Kenneth L. Kraemer, Intangible Assets and Value Capture in
Global Value Chains: The Smartphone Industry 3-4 (World Intellectual Prop. Org., Working
Paper No. 41, 2017).
2.
Each “generation” (or “G”) in wireless communications reflects an increase in the
efficiency with which data can be transmitted, enabling the evolution of wireless markets from
mostly voice transmission to the transmission of all types of voice and non-voice data. See
Rafael Saraiva Campos, Evolution of Positioning Techniques in Cellular Networks, from 2G
to 4G, WIRELESS COMMS. AND MOBILE COMPUTING 2017, at 1, 2. On the historical timeline
of wireless communications standards, see Mudit Ratana Bhalla & Anand Vardhan Bhalla,
Generations of Mobile Wireless Technologies: A Survey, 5 INT’L J. COMPUTER APPLICATIONS
26 (2010).
3.
On the core technological elements and practical applications of 5G networks, see
Nicolo Zingales, Of Coffee Pods, Videogames and Missed Interoperability: Reflections for EU
Governance of the Internet of Things (Tilburg Law and E. Ctr., Discussion Paper 2015-026,
2015); Firooz B. Saghezchi et al., Drivers for 5G: The ‘Pervasive Connected’ World, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF MOBILE NETWORKS, 6-11 (Jonathan Rodriguez ed., Wiley 2015); Peter
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tain standardized pathways for information transmission. This transformational shift presents not only a technological challenge but also an organizational challenge that demands an appropriate institutional environment to
support the necessary R&D and commercialization investments by technology innovators and implementers.
Nothing less than the institutional structure of the information technology markets has been targeted by antitrust agencies in the United States, and
other commercially significant jurisdictions, over the past decade. This regulatory campaign has culminated in the landmark antitrust litigation brought
by the Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”) against Qualcomm, a semiconductor firm that is widely recognized as the leading innovator in the
4
smartphone industry. On May 21, 2019, the district court in the FTC suit
issued an expansive order (which Qualcomm plans to appeal as of this writ5
ing ) requiring that Qualcomm re-negotiate hundreds of “standard-essential”
patent (“SEP”) licenses with device manufacturers and offer new SEP li6
censes to any interested chip manufacturers. If upheld on appeal, this order
would substantially rewrite the “rules of the game” in patent licensing for
the smartphone market. Prior to and concurrently with the FTC suit, competition regulators (excepting a policy shift in November 2017 at the De7
partment of Justice (“DOJ”)’s Antitrust Division ) in the U.S., China, the
European Union, South Korea, and Taiwan have similarly sought to limit
firms’ ability to enforce patents and patent licenses in the smartphone mar8
ket. Both regulators and a concurrent scholarly literature have repeatedly
asserted that patents and patent licenses impose a “tax” that threatens the
standard-setting initiatives that have accompanied the 2G, 3G, and 4G net9
works.
Rost et al., Mobile Network Architecture Evolution Toward 5G, IEEE COMMS. MAG., May
2016, 84.
4.
On Qualcomm’s pioneering innovation in the wireless communications market, see
DAVE MOCK, THE QUALCOMM EQUATION: HOW A FLEDGLING TELECOM COMPANY FORGED
A NEW PATH TO BIG PROFITS AND MARKET DOMINANCE 47-79, 175-85 (2005); Sanford
Lakoff, Upstart Startup: “Constructed Advantage” and the Example of Qualcomm, 28
TECHNOVATION 831 (2008).
5.
See Stephen Nellis, Qualcomm asks U.S. judge to put anti-trust ruling on hold
while chipmaker appeals, REUTERS (May 28, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/usqualcomm-antitrust/qualcomm-asks-u-s-judge-to-put-anti-trust-ruling-on-hold-whilechipmaker-appeals-idUSKCN1SZ04R.
6.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 227-29, F.T.C. v. Qualcomm, Inc., No.
17-CV-00220-LHK (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2019).
7.
On the policy shift at the DOJ, dating from November 2017, see infra note 221 and
accompanying text.
8.
See infra note 261, Table 5 and accompanying text.
9.
See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC Charges Qualcomm With Monopolizing Key
Semiconductor Device Used in Cell Phones (January 17, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-charges-qualcomm-monopolizing-key-semiconductordevice-used (claiming that royalties assessed by Qualcomm “amount to a tax on the manufacturers’ use of baseband processors manufactured by Qualcomm’s competitors”).
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In this Article, I show that this argument has things exactly backward:
patents and patent licenses support the standardization mechanisms that
have driven the exceptional success of the smartphone markets. It is regulators’ top-down interventions, rather than the bottom-up network of voluntarily negotiated licensing agreements, that threaten to unravel this remarkable
market-driven mechanism for incentivizing innovation, standardization, and
dissemination of new technologies across a wide array of products and services for end-users.
10
The regulatory and academic near-consensus relies on a false factual
premise that leads to misguided policy. The factual premise is mistaken because there is simply no compelling empirical evidence to support regulators’ claims that even the largest patent owners widely engage in “patent
11
holdup” or “royalty stacking,” or even have rational incentives to do so.
Consistent with the exceptional growth of the smartphone industry, all empirical studies have reached relatively modest estimates of the total royalty
12
burden typically borne by device manufacturers. The policy conclusion is
mistaken because it ignores the basic fact that a secure legal foundation of
property rights and contract is a necessary predicate to induce innovators to
undertake high-cost, high-risk R&D and then disclose the results in a standard-setting process over which no individual firm exerts unilateral control.
If that legal predicate is no longer satisfied, firms that currently specialize in
innovation are likely to reduce R&D activities, withdraw from standardsetting activities, or construct closed innovation environments in which
firms monetize R&D through proprietary hardware and software products.
All those outcomes are almost certainly inferior relative to the status quo.
Following the conventional view, scholars and regulators have widely
predicted that the combination of abundant intellectual property (“IP”)
rights, multiple IP holders, and multi-component systems that characterizes
13
wireless device markets is liable to yield a “tragedy of the anti-commons”
in which high IP density inflates prices, reduces access and impedes innova14
tion. Those types of statements can be found in scholarly publications, in-

10.
To be sure, there are exceptions. For contributions that discuss the enabling role of
patents in technology standardization, see for example, Kristen Jakobson Osenga, Ignorance
over Innovation: Why Misunderstanding Standard Setting Organizations Will Hinder Technological Progress, 56 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 159, 159-60 (2018); David J. Kappos, Innovation-Based Technology Standards Are Under Threat, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/innovation-based-technology-standards-are-under-threat/.
11.
For discussion, see infra notes 149-156 and accompanying text.
12.
See id.
13.
For the original application of this concept in the IP context, with respect to biomedical research, see Michael Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
14.
See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools
and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 120-21 (Adam B. Jaffe
et al. eds., 2001) (describing concerns that a “patent thicket” can slow down innovation). For
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fluential reports issued by the DOJ, the FTC and the Patent & Trademark
15
Office (“PTO”) from 2003 through 2013 , and statements made by compe16
tition agencies in the European Union and Asian jurisdictions. Some
scholars are already making similar claims before the Internet of Things has
even been deployed, arguing that intensive patent usage in that market “is
17
likely to cause significant social welfare loss in the years ahead.”
This near-consensus among much of the scholarly and policymaking
communities faces one minor difficulty: it does not describe any actual realworld market. As the wireless communications industry has moved from 2G
to 3G to 4G standards, patent issuance and the dispersion of patent owner18
ship has increased. The consensus view would expect to observe some
combination of increased prices, reduced output, blocked entry, and delayed
innovation. Yet markets have disobeyed that theory. Quality-adjusted prices
on mobile telephone devices and computing equipment have fallen,
smartphone devices have rapidly achieved high rates of adoption in consumer markets, entry rates in device production have remained robust, and
computing and communications functionalities have continuously im19
proved.

detailed critical reviews of these arguments, see J. Gregory Sidak, Is Patent Holdup a Hoax?,
3 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 401, 435-45 (2018) [hereinafter Sidak, Hoax]; Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 BERK. TECH. L. J. 1313, 1338-56 (2017)
[hereinafter Barnett, Has the Academy].
15.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., POLICY STATEMENT
ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND
COMMITMENTS 4, 6 n.13 (2013) [hereinafter DOJ/USPTO REPORT 2013]; FTC, THE
EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH
COMPETITION 28, 191, 234-35 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT 2011]; FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 8, 35, 42, 57, 95 (2007) [hereinafter FTC/DOJ REPORT
2007]; FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY, Executive Summary at 6, 7, 15, ch.1 at 33, ch. 2 at 3, ch. 3 at 30,
37-38, ch. 4 at 5 (2003).
16.
For discussion of this global trend, see Douglas H. Ginsburg et al., The Troubling
Use of Antitrust to Regulate FRAND Licensing, 10 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 2, 2 (2015). For
an example, see Commission Decision of Apr. 29, 2014, Case AT.39939 – Samsung – Enforcement of UMTS Standard Essential Patents 11 (EC).
17.
See Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Patent Assertions: Are We Any Closer to
Aligning Reward to Contribution?, in 16 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 89, 124
(2016) (“For example, the ‘Internet of Things’ is a new and growing area where royalty stacking and patent holdup appear to be very real dangers.”).
18.
See JORGE PADILLA ET AL., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS 19
tbl. 7 (COMPASS LEXECON 2017). On the increase in patent issuance relating to the
smartphone market, see WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REPORT 2017: INTANGIBLE CAPITAL IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 106, 110 (2017)
[hereinafter WORLD IP REPORT].
19.
See infra notes 153-156 and accompanying text. For detailed discussion of this evidence, see Barnett, Has the Academy, supra note 14, at 1338-61.
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The now-standard view has a clear normative implication: namely,
weaken IP rights and intervene in privately negotiated licensing arrangements to “protect” the public interest against opportunistic enforcement and
royalty rate-setting by patent owners. Illustrated most vividly by the sweep20
ing order issued in the FTC v. Qualcomm litigation , courts and regulators
in the U.S. and other commercially significant jurisdictions (again, with the
21
recent exception of the DOJ Antitrust Division ) have adopted policies that
threaten the security of SEPs and the associated licensing infrastructure that
stands behind the smartphone and related ICT markets. Specifically, courts
and regulators have largely withdrawn the possibility of injunctive relief for
SEP owners while regulators have advocated approaches for determining
“reasonable royalties” in SEP infringement litigation and SEP licenses that
would effectively reallocate market surplus away from innovators and toward device producers. This regulatory and judicial “reset” of the property
rules in ICT markets distorts market negotiations between innovator-firms
that supply the smartphone market with R&D inputs and producer-firms that
embed those inputs into devices for the end-user. If there is no credible
threat of injunctive relief, a downstream firm that can fund an extended litigation process (an assumption easily satisfied by the largest branded handset
manufacturers) will elect what some industry observers now call “efficient”
22
infringement : that is, use the upstream firm’s technology and then negotiate the royalty rate in the courthouse, rather than the marketplace.
The sequence of policy actions pursued by competition regulators in the
U.S. and other jurisdictions has overlooked the patent-dependent organizational mechanisms that have supported both robust R&D investment and
standardization initiatives in wireless communications markets. For several
decades, those markets have achieved those two objectives through a bottom-up process of private ordering rooted in three legal anchors: (i) reasonably secure IP rights, (ii) quasi-contractual commitments informed by reputational norms, and (iii) surgically applied antitrust safeguards against
collusion. A secure foundation of IP rights and contract enforcement is necessary to induce an innovator-firm to invest in R&D and contribute the resulting output toward a collective standard-setting initiative. A rational
manager will only allocate resources to these high-cost, high-risk activities
on the expectation that the firm can expect ultimately to earn returns
through licensing relationships with producer-firms that have the capital and
expertise to embody R&D in products for the end-user market. From a
competition policy perspective, this vertically disaggregated structure, over

20.
See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
21.
On the policy shift at the DOJ, dating from November 2017, see infra note 211 and
accompanying text.
22.
See, e.g., Michael T. Renaud et al., Efficient Infringement and the Undervaluation
of Standard-Essential Patents, 79 INTELL. ASSET MGMT. 59 (2016).
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which no individual firm can exercise control, compares favorably with
more historically prevalent mechanisms for achieving standardization
through the coercive power of a government monopoly regulator or the
market power wielded by a single dominant firm.
The approximately three-decade history of wireless communications
networks has shown how standardization can be achieved without government direction, thereby harnessing the superior information-gathering and
processing capacities of the private market, but without entrenching a single
dominant incumbent, thereby avoiding the pricing, output, and other distortions inherent to a monopolized market. When this occurs, there is no quasiutility entity setting the standard, and government intervention counterproductively substitutes an ad hoc rate-setting process, as implemented through
legal proceedings, for the collective judgment of market actors, as expressed
through the price discovery mechanism. As scholars working in the public
choice tradition have emphasized and documented, resource allocation
through the political process presumptively underperforms resource allocation through the market due to inherent informational disadvantages, bureaucratic delay and the susceptibility of political entities to capture by well23
organized rent-seeking constituencies. In the wireless communications
markets, a consistent pattern of political-economic behavior supplies substantial ground for the latter concern, at both the “firm level” and the “country level.” Since the inception of these markets, firms and countries that
specialize in the production, assembly and distribution segments of the ICT
supply chain have advocated for, and achieved substantial success in securing, outcomes in antitrust and patent law that attenuate patent owners’ ability to bring enforcement actions against, and negotiate licensing fees with,
intermediate users. From a privately interested perspective, the logic is selfevident. Weakening patents shifts the “IP balance of trade” in favor of firms
and countries that principally occupy downstream portions of the ICT supply chain while potentially undercompensating firms that specialize in upstream R&D. From a publicly interested perspective, however, regulatory
and judicial interventions that erode the property rights and contracting infrastructure behind wireless technology markets endangers the cooperative
standardization mechanisms that have supported innovation and commercialization in these markets.
This Article comprises five parts. In Part I, I review the efficiency gains
that are attributable to standardization and the principal mechanisms by
which ICT markets have achieved standardization. In Part II, I compare the
net welfare effects of each principal standardization mechanism. In Part III,

23.
For classic statements of this view, see ROBERT E. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D.
TOLLISON, POLITICIZED ECONOMIES: MONARCHY, MONOPOLY AND MERCANTILISM 27-46
(1997); ROBERT E. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, MERCANTILISM AS A RENTSEEKING SOCIETY: ECONOMIC REGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3-25 (1981).
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I show that secure IP rights and contract enforcement are a critical predicate
for enabling cooperative standardization without recourse to a monopolist
entity, whether a government regulator or a dominant incumbent. In Part IV,
I explore how regulators and courts’ recent interventions in wireless markets
endanger cooperative standardization by eroding the security of patents and
associated licensing agreements. In Part V, I show how these policy choices
advantage firms and economies that specialize in implementation over firms
and economies that specialize in innovation, posing risks to a successful innovation ecosystem. Then, I briefly conclude.

I. Standardization in Technology Markets:
Foundational Observations
This Part addresses two foundational elements in the policy analysis of
standardization processes. First, I review the economic benefits that can be
reasonably attributed to successful standardization initiatives in technology
markets. Second, I review the fundamental types of mechanisms by which
governments and markets have sought to achieve standardization.

A. The Social Value of Standardization
It is widely recognized that standardization is a precondition for achiev24
ing the interoperability that characterizes contemporary ICT markets. Consumers are accustomed to expect that an HP printer can communicate with a
Dell PC, or a Samsung handset can communicate with an Apple iPhone,
which can in turn communicate with an LG television. But this market
structure is not self-evident. Until the launch of the IBM PC in 1981, a user
who sought to put together a computing package was generally compelled
25
to purchase all components from a single provider. As the digital economy
now proceeds toward engineering a complex network of information pathways between home, office, and industrial devices that extend beyond traditionally defined ICT markets, the importance of interoperability will only
increase. The web of data-gathering, processing and transmission relationships that will characterize the 5G ecosystem will depend on standardized
protocols by which individual and entity-level users can gather, exchange
26
and analyze data with speed, reliability, and security. This standardization
24.
For general treatments of the economics of standardization, with a focus on ICT
markets, see KNUT BLIND, THE ECONOMICS OF STANDARDS: THEORY, EVIDENCE, POLICY
(2004); PETER GRINDLEY, STANDARDS, STRATEGY AND POLICY: CASES AND STORIES 1-54
(1995); Paul A. David & Shane Greenstein, The Economics of Compatibility Standards: An
Introduction to Recent Research, 1 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 3 (1990).
25.
See GRINDLEY, supra note 24, at 163-64.
26.
See Saghezchi et al., supra note 3, at 3 (stating that “[g]lobal standards are a fundamental cornerstone in reaching ubiquitous connectivity, ensuring worldwide interoperability, enabling multi-vendor harmonization and economies of scale”).
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process has three principal pro-competitive effects: (i) increased network
effects; (ii) reduced entry costs; and (iii) reduced hold-up risk.

1. Network Effects
Network effects refer to the fact that the consumption value of certain
goods increases as a function of the number of other users, or the number of
27
uses, of those goods. This is an inherent characteristic of communication
devices (for example, a cellphone has greater consumption value as the
number of other users of cellphones increases) and communication platforms (for example, Facebook), and a common, if not typical, characteristic
of certain computing devices or components of a larger computing environment (for example, the Windows operating system has greater consumption value as the number of Windows-compatible applications increases).
Standardization amplifies network effects (and hence, the value of the relevant device or platform) by increasing the number of users with whom any
individual user can communicate—or, more precisely, by minimizing the
28
costs incurred by any individual user to communicate with other users. A
vivid illustration is provided by the adoption of the GSM standard in the European wireless telecommunications markets starting in the early 1990s.
This development created a transnational market for digital transmission of
voice communications among hundreds of millions of users, a substantial
improvement over what had previously been mostly localized national mar29
kets separated by incompatible country-specific standards.

2. Entry Costs
Standardization and interoperability lower entry costs by relieving firms
from having to provide an “end-to-end” package of complementary goods
and services. This was not the case in the computing markets that predated
the advent of the PC: computing firms typically supplied business customers
with a complete, or substantially complete, bundle of hardware and software
30
solutions. Given that these packages were not typically interoperable with
each other, any new competitor was required to deliver a functionally comparable and approximately cost-equivalent package of products and services. By contrast, in today’s “plug and play” computing market, an assembler firm such as Dell can offer customers a bundle comprised of software

27.
See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Effects and Externalities, in 2
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS & THE LAW 671 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998).
28.
See GRINDLEY, supra note 24, at 2.
29.
See Rudi Bekkers et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Standardization: The
Case of GSM, 26 TELECOMM. POL’Y 171, 186 (2002).
30.
MICHAEL D. SCOTT, SCOTT ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW xxii (3d ed.
2018).
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and hardware components supplied by multiple firms. Given a common
technological standard, a firm can contemplate entry into a particular ICT
market by providing only a superior product or service at a single point on
31
the supply chain or operating as an assembler entity that integrates components supplied by firms with different areas of specialization. This reduces,
potentially dramatically, the costs and expertise required to achieve viable
entry into a technology market. In the aggregate, the economically attractive
results include increased entry opportunities, specialization of labor, and
price and quality competition throughout the supply chain.

3. Hold-Up Risk
Any new technology demands that intermediate and end-users incur
significant adoption, learning, and other costs. If a user expects to incur
comparable costs in switching to any alternative technology, then it anticipates that a technology provider may have incentives to adversely change
the terms of access once the user has made the necessary investment to
adopt the provider’s technology. This scenario is an application of the
standard hold-up problem in industrial organization. In its simplest form, the
hold-up problem arises whenever one party has made a substantial investment in a business relationship and that investment has no or lesser value in
any other use. Setting aside reputation effects or contractual protections, the
non-investing party (or the party that has not made a comparably-sized investment in the relationship) then has an incentive to unilaterally alter the
terms of the relationship to its advantage given that the investing party can32
not credibly threaten to exit except at a substantial loss. In the technology
context, this implies that a provider will have an incentive to expropriate
value from a user in an amount almost equivalent to the switching costs that
the user would incur in migrating to an alternative technology.
Standardization can attenuate the hold-up problem by reducing users’
switching costs. To the extent that users do not purchase a complete bundle
sold by a single firm but rather have the ability to “mix and match” components from multiple firms, they have lower switching costs. As a consequence, the provider of any particular component (or an assembler that mar-

31.
For relevant discussion, see PADILLA ET AL., supra note 18, at 24, 32; BLIND, supra
note 24, at 17. On the movement of the computing industry from vertically integrated firms
that offered stand-alone computing packages to horizontally specialized firms that offer interoperable components, see Joel West, Does Appropriability Enable or Retard Open Innovation?, in OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM (Henry Chesbrough et al. eds.,
2006).
32.
For the classic source, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM 52-61 (1985). For related and widely-cited treatments, see Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. &
ECON. 233, 234 (1979); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and
the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 297-98 (1978).
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kets a package of components) has more limited (although still some) holdup opportunities. In the aggregate, this operates to the benefit of both providers and users in technology markets. If lower switching costs imply that
providers will have more limited hold-up opportunities, then users will no
longer demand a discount at the time of adoption to reflect the risk of rationally opportunistic behavior on the part of the provider. The result is a
virtuous cycle in which market adoption and size expand, enhancing the
network effects, entry opportunities and specialization efficiencies discussed
above.

B. Paradigm Standardization Mechanisms
Technology standardization represents a coordination problem in which
at least a substantial portion of the relevant market must converge upon a
common platform on the basis of which firms can develop complementary
products and services, each of which then interacts with one another with
minimal transactional friction. Both in theory and as a matter of historical
experience, there are three types of mechanisms by which economies have
achieved (or have sought to achieve) this objective: (i) standardization by a
government regulator; (ii) standardization by a dominant firm; and (iii)
33
standardization by cooperative action.

1. Standardization by Government Monopoly
A government entity can specify a particular standard and, using the coercive power of law, compel market actors to comply with that standard.
This mechanism is widely used in food and ethical drug markets by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture and the Food & Drug Administration, in the automotive market by the National Transportation Safety Board, and in the
34
aviation industry by the Federal Aviation Administration. In a variant on
this option, the government may mandate a generally defined standard and
then rely on designated private entities to execute the remainder of the

33.
For a similar tripartite distinction between governmental, cooperative and monopolist forms of standardization, see Osenga, supra note 10, at 164; PADILLA ET AL., supra note
18, at 3, 36; Sean P. Gates, Standards, Innovation, and Antitrust: Integration Innovation Concerns into the Analysis of Collaborative Standard Setting, 47 EMORY L.J. 583, 597-98 (1998).
Much of the literature relies on a more general distinction between de facto and de jure standardization, in which the former refers to market standardization by a dominant firm or a coalition of firms (sometimes called a consortium) and the latter refers to standardization by a governmental body or a recognized standardization entity that operates on a nonprofit basis. See,
e.g., GRINDLEY, supra note 24, at 25; Joel West, The Economic Realities of Open Standards,
in STANDARDS AND PUBLIC POLICY 94 (eds. Shane Greenstein & Victor Stango eds., 2007)
[hereinafter West, Economic realities]; David & Greenstein, supra note 24, at 4.
34.
For a discussion of these and other government standard-setting agencies, see
SAMUEL KRISLOV, HOW NATIONS CHOOSE PRODUCT STANDARDS AND STANDARDS CHANGE
NATIONS 117-18 (1997).
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standard-setting and standard-compliance process. A well-known example
in the U.S. context is the role of the leading credit rating firms, Standard &
Poor’s and Moody’s, on which the Securities and Exchange Commission
36
partially relies in executing certain regulatory objectives. In other markets,
governments have explicitly or implicitly recognized certain national and
international organizations (for example, the American National Standards
Institute) as the exclusive standard-setting entity, which in turn sometimes
delegates standard-setting or accreditation functions to regional and indus37
try-specific entities.

2. Standardization by Private Monopoly
A firm that has a sufficiently large share of the market can effectively
specify a quasi-mandatory standard—what is sometimes called a de facto
standard—by virtue of the fact that its technology has been adopted as a
38
critical component for related products and services in the relevant market.
39
Typically this “monopoly” standard is the result of an initial and intense
competition between different standards at the emergence of the relevant
market. This scenario is commonly illustrated by the Microsoft Windows
operating system (“OS”), which (including its antecedent, MS-DOS) has
operated as a near-universal technological component in the PC market
since prevailing in an initial “standards war” among competing operating
40
systems in the early 1980s. The Windows platform has provided a common language for developers to write applications for that platform (some35.
For a discussion of this structure and related public-private standard-setting mechanisms, see Panagiotis Delimatsis, Introduction: Continuity and Change in International
Standardization, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDISATION 4-6 (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2015).
36.
The Dodd-Frank Act placed substantial limitations on this practice. See Frank
Partnoy, What’s (Still) Wrong with Credit Ratings, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1407, 1419-27 (2017).
37.
See Carl Cargill & Sherrie Bolin, Standardization: A Failing Paradigm, in
STANDARDS AND PUBLIC POLICY 302 (Shane Greenstein & Victor Stango 2007).
38.
See SUSANNE K. SCHMIDT & RAYMUND WERLE, COORDINATING TECHNOLOGY:
STUDIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 86 (1998).
39.
Unless otherwise specified, throughout I use the term “monopoly” or “dominant
firm” interchangeably to refer to a firm that holds a substantial market share and is protected
to some extent from immediate entry, resulting in some appreciable degree of pricing power.
40.
Mikko Valimaki and Ville Oksanen, The impact of free and open source licensing
on operating system software markets, 22 Telematics and Informatics 97, 98 (2005); Martin
Campbell-Kelly, Not Only Microsoft: The Maturing of the Personal Computer Software Industry, 1982-1995, 75 Bus. Hist. Rev. 103, 112-14 (2001). As of 1992, Microsoft’s share of
the PC operating system market was estimated to be approximately 90%. See Richard J. Gilbert, Networks, Standards and the Use of Market Dominance: Microsoft, in THE ANTITRUST
REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION AND POLICY 410-11 (eds. John E. Kwoka, Jr. and
rd
Lawrence J. White, 3 ed. 1999). As of April 2019, its market share was estimated at 79%.
See Desktop Operating System Market Share Worldwide Apr 2018 – Apr 2019,
STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/desktop/worldwide/2018 (last visited May 21, 2019).
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thing that Microsoft promoted by providing developers with access to the
41
Windows OS’s application programming interfaces ), which has in turn
promoted adoption by a large population of end-users. The dominance of
the MS Windows standard is suggested by its longevity and the failure of
the desktop computing market to migrate to the zero-price alternative of42
fered by the Linux OS. Even this powerful standard has ultimately been
exposed to some competitive discipline, as demonstrated by Windows’ failure to penetrate the handset and mobile device markets that are dominated
43
by the Apple iOS and Linux-based Android operating systems, which
mimic some of the functionalities provided by a PC.

3. Standardization by Cooperative Action
A group of firms or other entities can agree collectively upon the specification of a common standard for a particular technology market. This can
be accomplished through arrangements that operate at different levels of
formalization and openness, ranging from accredited standard-development
organizations that operate at high levels of openness and transparency, to
unaccredited but still highly formalized standard-setting organizations
(“SSOs”) that are generally open to all interested parties, and ad hoc industry consortia consisting of a relatively small number of industry leaders for
44
purposes of promoting adoption of a particular technology. Analogous to
the case of standardization by a monopolist, this scenario is often characterized by an initial stage in which multiple standards groups compete with one
another, which typically results in a single or predominant standard. A familiar example is the standards war in the high-definition video player market, in which the HD DVD standard (supported by a consortium led by
Toshiba) lost out to the Blu-Ray standard (supported by a consortium led by
45
Sony). More recent examples in the wireless markets include the rivalry
between GSM and CDMA-based systems in the U.S., European and Japanese markets (with mostly the latter standard having prevailed in the 3G

41.
See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Host’s Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture in Platform
Markets, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1872-73 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett, Host’s Dilemma].
42.
While the Linux OS has achieved substantial adoption in the server market and, as
modified in the Android OS, the mobile device market, this is not the case in the desktop PC
market. See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Costs of Free: Commoditization, Bundling and Concentration, J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 1, 4-5 Fig. 1 (2018) [hereinafter Barnett, Costs of Free].
43.
See id.
44.
On the distinctions between these types of cooperative standard-setting entities, see
Cargill & Bolin, supra note 34, at 302-04, 323-26. In this paper, I use the term, “SSO”, broadly to cover any type of non-governmental standardization entity.
45.
See Scott R. Gallagher, The Battle of the Blue Laser DVDs: The Significance of
Corporate Strategy in Standards Battles, 32 TECHNOVATION 90 (2012).
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46

standardization process ), as well as the rivalry in the 4G market between
the WiMAX standard advocated by a group led by Intel and the LTE (Long
Term Evolution) standard advocated by a group of firms led by Qualcomm
47
(with the latter having prevailed in the 4G standardization process). While
some firms have held substantial IP positions in these standards, no single
firm has enjoyed independent control over the standard as in the case of Microsoft Windows or a government agency in the case of state-mandated
standards. In the emergent 5G network, patent positions are even more
48
widely dispersed and multiple consortia and similar groups have arisen to
establish standards for information transmission at different levels of the
49
network.

II. Comparative Welfare Effects of
Standardization Mechanisms
There is little doubt that standardization yields substantial social gains
in the form of increased network effects, reduced entry costs, and accelerated adoption by intermediate and end-users. This uncontroversial view is il50
lustrated by the explosive growth of the PC and smartphone markets, both
of which relied on the establishment of widely adopted market standards: in
the former case, Microsoft’s Windows OS, and in the latter, the GSM and
CDMA technologies in the 2G, 3G and 4G cellular communications markets. As those markets illustrate, standardization can be achieved through
various mechanisms (a single dominant firm in the case of Windows; cooperative multi-firm arrangements in the case of the wireless communications
markets). Each mechanism inherently gives rise to certain social costs that
must be incurred to achieve the gains associated with standardization.
Hence, it is necessary to weigh the anticipated social costs and gains reasonably attributable to each mechanism in order to arrive at even an imperfect comparative net welfare assessment of these alternative routes toward
51
standardization. In this Part, I discuss the likely net welfare effects of each

46.
See Pat Norton, Newcomers and Innovation in the U.S. Telephone Industry – Then
and Now, in THE EMERGENCE OF THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
234-35 (Zoltan J. Acs et al. eds., 2002).
47.
See PADILLA ET AL., supra note 18, at 10, 42.
48.
See infra Table 2; PADILLA ET AL., supra note 18, at 19 tbl. 7.
49.
Some of these organizations include 3GPP, the Open Interconnect Consortium (led
by Intel), the AllSeen Alliance (led by Qualcomm), the Industrial Internet Consortium, the
Thread Group, IEEE P2413 and Open M2M. See Zingales, supra note 3, at 30-31.
50.
See Dedrick & Kraemer, supra note 1.
51.
My discussion builds on prior contributions that have discussed the welfare effects
of different mechanisms for achieving standardization. See PADILLA ET AL., supra note 18, at
25-44, who compare standard development organizations to standard-setting by government
entities and standard-setting by a monopolist. For a comparison of the economic effects of
standard-setting through cooperative entities such as SSOs and a market-based “standards
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of the three paradigm standardization structures (and referenced in the Table
below), taking into account the existing body of theoretical and empirical
analysis relating to the economics and (what is sometimes overlooked) history of standardization processes in technology markets. To structure this
analysis, I discuss specifically the expected performance of these standardization structures at two critical stages in the standard-setting timeline: (i)
standard selection; and (ii) standard implementation.

Table 1: Standardization Paradigms
PARADIGM

STANDARDSETTING
ENTITIES

LEGAL
STATUS

ILLUSTRATIONS

Government
monopoly

Government or
“quasigovernment”
entity

De jure

FDA (food and drug);
USDA (agricultural
goods); FAA (aircraft);
NTSA (automotive)

Market
monopoly

Single dominant
firm

De facto

Microsoft Windows,
Word, Excel,
PowerPoint; Intel x86
processors; IBM
System/370

Cooperative
action

Multiple firms or
other entities

De facto

Bluetooth; USB; DVD;
HDMI; GSM (2G);
UMTS (3G); LTE (4G);
Firewire; Ethernet; WiFi

war” see Joanne Tsai & Joshua D. Wright, Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights and
the Role of Antitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts, 80 ANTITRUST L. J. 157 (2014). See
Shane Greenstein & Marc Rysman, Coordination Costs and Standard Setting, in STANDARDS
AND PUBLIC POLICY (Shane Greenstein & Victor Stango eds., 2007), who compare, through a
case study of the “56K modem” standard, the comparative advantages of standard-setting
through an SSO as compared to market competition and regulatory intervention. An older
theoretical contribution analyzed the relative efficiency of achieving standardization through
markets, committees (roughly analogous to SSOs in real-world markets), and hybrid mechanisms. See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Coordination Through Committees and Markets,
19 RAND J. ECON. 235 (1988).
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A. Government Standardization
Historically, standardization by government action has often been
viewed as the “default” mechanism by which economies achieve the two
critical steps of standard selection and standard implementation (or more
precisely, standard adoption, which is then followed by implementation by
52
private entities). This assumption is reflected in the U.S. Constitution,
which provides that “Congress shall have Power To . . . fix the Standard of
53
Weights and Measures.” This view reflects the intuition that markets left
to their own devices would be unable to agree upon a common standard, either because no firm would have an incentive to independently invest in
standardization (a costly activity that confers uncompensated benefits on
others) or each firm would seek to maximize profits by securing adoption of
54
its proprietary technology as the market standard. A government-based
mechanism for achieving standardization has the advantage that, subject to
rule-promulgation and enforcement costs, it can use the coercive force of
law to induce compliance with a standard. As a practical matter, government standardization mechanisms have operated either directly through regulatory entities or, as has been more common historically in the U.S., indirectly through quasi-governmental nonprofit entities that were subsequently
recognized as the authoritative standardization authority in a particular in55
dustry. As noted in the Table above, government standardization remains
prevalent in markets involving public safety issues such as food, ethical
drugs, and transportation.
While government standardization exhibits enforcement efficiencies
arising from a state’s coercive powers, it suffers from certain inefficiencies
that are inherent to any monopolized form of standard-setting that is not exposed to competitive discipline. First, a government standardization monopoly may select the “wrong” standard—meaning, a standard that reduces
transaction costs less efficiently as compared to other technologically feasible standards—or fail to appropriately update an existing standard. If the
government acts as the exclusive entity for setting and updating a particular
standard, the risk of inefficient standard selection and maintenance is exacerbated by the fact that there is no process by which prospective standardsetting entities must compete to induce users to invest resources in adopting

52.
See KRISLOV, supra note 34, at 54 (stating that “government regulations represent a
rich source—historically, the richest source—of standards); id. at 132 (noting that European
standard-setting has taken place principally through national standard organizations, which are
usually governmental).
53.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
54.
See David & Greenstein, supra note 24, at 33.
55.
See Pierre Larouche & Geertrui van Overwalle, Interoperability Standards, Patents
and Competition Policy, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDISATION 367, 369-70 (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2015). On the history of standardization in the U.S. in particular, see Cargill & Bolin, supra note 34, at 299-300.
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56

(and retaining) a particular standard. Second, a government standardization monopoly gives rise to the social losses associated with rent-seeking
efforts by private entities to capture regulators and influence standardization
choices to advance private interests. As a result, a government standardsetting entity may pursue collateral policy objectives (such as favoring domestic or otherwise politically favored firms) that are not aligned with mar57
ket efficiency. Consistent with this logic, the Supreme Court’s 2015 deci58
sion in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC
emphasized the inherent risk of anticompetitive conduct in the case of governmentally authorized standard-setting monopolies that are administered
by industry representatives. While similarly opportunistic behavior could
arise in private standard-setting entities that may be governed or heavily in59
fluenced by affected constituencies (as discussed below ), the coercive capacities of a government entity, together with the displacement of a competitive market for standard-setting services, may increase the incidence or
severity of such behavior.
60
As noted above , government standardization is sometimes achieved
through a hybrid model in which a government agency identifies a standardization objective in general terms and then designates a private entity to execute the standardization process by developing more granular standards
and associated verification methodologies. Delegating these functions to entities that operate on a day-to-day basis in the relevant industry may improve the quality of the information that is reflected in the standard. However, there remains some appreciable risk of inefficient standard-setting and
maintenance insofar as the challenge of securing the government’s blessing
acts as an implicit entry barrier against other entities that are not yet designated as officially recognized market gatekeepers, thereby muting the otherwise favorable effects of a competitive standard-setting environment. As
61
noted above, a well-known example is the handful of credit-rating agencies relied upon by the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection
with the registration of public debt securities. The performance record of
these entities is contested. In the wake of the 2007-08 financial crisis, com-

56.
For similar thoughts, see PADILLA ET AL., supra note 18, at 40. For a general overview of informational deficiencies in government standard-setting, see David & Greenstein,
supra note 24, at 29-31. The assumption that a government standardization entity is not subject to competitive discipline may be attenuated in a global economy to the extent that potentially adopting firms can “shop around” among government and private standardization providers. For evidence that this occurred in the Chinese market, see infra note 284 and
accompanying text. However, note that governments can always elect to compel firms under
their jurisdiction to adopt the government-designated standard.
57.
See GRINDLEY, supra note 24, at 62-63; David & Greenstein, supra note 24, at 32.
58.
135 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2015).
59.
See infra Part II.C.2.
60.
See supra note 55.
61.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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mentators widely criticized the rating agencies’ apparent failure to appropriately assess the risk of certain financial instruments, which is sometimes attributed to the implicit entry barrier created by the difficulty of securing designation as a “nationally recognized statistical ratings organization” for
62
securities regulatory purposes.

B. Monopoly Standardization
Standards are sometimes set by firms with dominant market positions,
rather than through government entities (or government-designated private
entities) that enjoy a standardization monopoly as a matter of law. During
the postwar period and through the 1970s, IBM effectively set the dominant
architecture for the mainframe and certain other computing markets through
63
its System/370 family of computers. IBM’s influence reflected its overwhelming market share (ranging from 84% of the mainframe market in
64
1956 to 71% in 1986). Starting in the 1980s, Microsoft has set, and maintains, the de facto OS standard for the PC market, a position that Windows
65
OS secured after prevailing against competing systems. As compared to a
government standardization monopolist, a private standardization monopolist appears to compare favorably insofar as the initial standards war implies
a higher likelihood that the market may have converged upon the maximally
efficient standard, at least at the outset. In place of an administrative process
that is inherently subject to informational asymmetries, regulatory capture,
66
and bureaucratic delay , the monopolist must prevail (at least initially) in
competition against other standard-setters to secure adoption by intermediate and end-users. So long as that process is open to entry, there should be a
high level of confidence that the standards war has converged, at least initially, upon the most efficient technologically feasible option.
A substantial literature contests this proposition, taking the view that
standards wars may either end prematurely, selecting an inferior technological alternative, or exhibit inertia by not migrating to a superior new alterna-

62.
See Partnoy, supra note 36.
63.
See Timothy F. Bresnahan & Franco Malerba, Industrial Dynamics and the Evolution of Firms’ and Nations’ Competitive Capabilities in the World Computer Industry, in
SOURCES OF INDUSTRIAL LEADERSHIP: STUDIES OF SEVEN INDUSTRIES 79, 96-97 (David C.
Mowery & Richard R. Nelson eds., 1999).
64.
Micro Mart Growth Seen Threat to IBM, 15 COMPUTERWORLD 65 (1981).
65.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
66.
An historical episode from the AM radio market illustrates the extent to which bureaucratic inertia can slow down standard selection. The FCC deliberated from 1961 to 1982
over competing standards for the then-novel AM stereo radio market. Once the FCC allowed
stations to choose any standard (subject to the station’s allocated bandwidth), the market converged on a dominant standard within three years and the AM stereo market was launched.
See GRINDLEY, supra note 24, at 73.
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67

tive. This “lock-in” argument, which has mostly been presented in theoretical terms with some anecdotal support, relies on the fact that standards derive value from network effects, which are in turn supported by adoption
among certain user populations. Those effects can cause markets to “tip”
toward a single standard (in some theoretical models, due to random histori68
cal events ), which then makes it difficult for entrants to induce any individual user to incur the costs of switching to a competing platform that has
not yet achieved substantial adoption. Just as positive externalities can initially inhibit standard development, they can also inhibit migration away
from an entrenched standard. Hence, even assuming Windows was once the
most efficient computing platform among all feasible technological alternatives, there can be no assurance that this continues to be the case if entrants
must incur sufficiently high costs in order to persuade existing users to migrate to a more efficient, but not-yet-widely-adopted, platform. As a result,
even a technologically superior standard may be unable to achieve entry—
precisely the argument made by the federal government in its antitrust liti69
gation against Microsoft in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
The lock-in argument has been strongly contested on empirical grounds
by Stan Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis. Specifically, Liebowitz and Margolis argue that key historical cases cited in support of the lock-in theory
(for example, the victory of the allegedly inferior VHS video cassette recording standard over Sony’s Betamax standard) do not persuasively
70
demonstrate that the market selected the “wrong” standard. Relatedly, other authors have observed that, while established standards may enjoy dominance as a result of network effects and user switching costs, these obstacles
are not insurmountable and incumbent standard-setters are therefore subject
71
to some competitive discipline. Consistent with this view, there are multiple cases in which dominant pioneering standard-setters have rapidly lost
market share to entrants. Examples include the downfall of MySpace in the
streaming video market (challenged successfully by YouTube), Netscape
Navigator in the internet browser market (displaced by Microsoft’s Internet

67.
See W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by
Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 117 (1989); Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of
QWERTY, 75 AMER. ECON. REV. 332, 336 (1985).
68.
See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 64.
69.
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 52-53 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting
district court’s finding that users of operating systems are unlikely to switch to rivals, even in
response to a substantial increase in price).
70.
See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon
Tragedy, 82 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 133, 134-35 (1994) (noting that empirical support for
lock-in effects are weak); id. at 148-49 (noting lack of evidence for popular claim that market
selected the “wrong” standard in the video recorder market).
71.
See Barnett, Costs of Free, supra note 43, at 16-17; Timothy F. Bresnahan & PaiLing Yin, Standard Setting in Markets: The Browser War, in STANDARDS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 29 (Shane Greenstein & Victor Stango eds., 2007).

Spring 2019]

Antitrust Overreach

183

Explorer, which was ultimately displaced by Google’s Chrome), Yahoo! in
the search engine market (challenged successfully by Google), and Palm Pilot in the mobile device market (challenged successfully by Blackberry,
which was in turn challenged successfully by Apple’s iPhone and other
smartphone devices). The fact that even dominant standards are regularly
subject to competitive threats casts doubt on the view that markets are likely
to be locked into an inefficient standard for a considerable period of time.
As some commentators have suggested, the most well-grounded position
may be that standards markets exhibit “degrees” of lock-in, depending on
the capital and expertise required to achieve entry, which may delay or dis72
suade entry in certain circumstances. So long as any such lock-in effect is
weaker than a “government lock-in” effect enforced by law, however, it is
reasonable to maintain the presumption that market-based standard selection
and maintenance will tend to outperform assigning those functions to a government monopolist.

C. Cooperative Standardization
The final paradigm standardization structure lies approximately at an
intermediate point on an organizational spectrum bounded, at one end, by
government standardization, in which market selection of a dominant standard is displaced by an administrative expert-based process, and, at the other
end, by market standardization, in which standard setting is the result of
open-market competition among firms offering alternative coordination solutions. By contrast, what I will call “cooperative” standardization incorporates elements of both (i) market competition, insofar as the standard-setting
process is administered by personnel associated with profit-seeking firms
exposed to competitive discipline in corresponding product and services
markets, and (ii) bureaucratic decision-making, insofar as the standard is
specified primarily through cooperative interactions between technical per73
sonnel at those firms.

1. The Overlooked Virtues of Dispersed Patent Ownership
At the point of standard selection, the same reasons that suggest that
standardization by a private monopolist will outperform standardization by
a government monopolist support confidence in the standardization outcomes reached through cooperative arrangements. As compared to govern-

72.
See Shane & Greenstein, supra note 24, at 8-9. For a related view, see Bresnahan &
Yin, supra note 68, at 29-30, arguing that inertia in standards markets characterized by network effects may represent an “intermediate cost”, which persists but can be overcome by
sufficiently strong countervailing forces.
73.
On the technical character of the standard-setting process, and the dominant role of
engineers in that process, see SCHMIDT & WERLE, supra note 38, at 61; see Osenga, supra
note 10, at 179-80.
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ment standardization, there is a higher level of confidence that cooperative
standardization would result in selection of the maximally efficient standard
to the extent that the standard-setting entity must compete with other such
entities and is managed by market participants rather than expert bureaucrats who are not exposed to competitive discipline and are susceptible to
regulatory capture. In the case where the cooperative standard-setting entity
is not competing with other standard-setting entities, it still faces some market discipline to the extent that it must secure adoption by intermediate and
end-users (as contrasted with a government standard-setting entity that can
at least partially rely on the force of law to compel adoption).
At the subsequent stage of standard implementation, standardization by
cooperative action most likely outperforms standardization by a monopolist
as a general matter. Cooperative standardization necessarily implies that the
technology inputs required to implement the standard are diffused to some
extent across multiple firms, rather than being exclusively controlled by a
single firm, which would then be in a position to independently set and implement the standard. Absent collusion between the owners of patents incorporated in the standard, this suggests that the pricing power exercised by
any individual firm after cooperative selection of the dominant standard is
weaker as compared to a state of affairs in which a single firm sets, and controls implementation of, the standard through its IP portfolio. In the PC OS
market, Microsoft sets the standard by virtue of its ownership of the IP
rights relating to the Windows OS (and the network effects that may partially shelter the Windows franchise), which in turn confers upon Microsoft the
74
exclusive ability to produce, distribute, and modify the Windows OS. By
contrast, multiple firms hold ownership interests in the key technological
components required to produce and distribute a smartphone device, potentially resulting in more attenuated pricing power as compared to a market in
75
which a single firm owns all components of the standard. In the 4G/LTE
74.
I recognize that the extent to which Microsoft has been able to, or has elected to,
exert pricing power with respect to Windows OS is highly debated. For some of those competing views, see MICROSOFT, ANTITRUST AND THE NEW ECONOMY: SELECTED ESSAYS
(David S. Evans ed., 2002). My argument simply relies on the assumption that a monopolist
provider of a technology standard is in general likely to have greater pricing power as compared to a market in which multiple firms hold ownership interests in various components of a
standard.
75.
Others would argue just the opposite. Specifically, it might be argued that a state of
affairs in which multiple firms hold patents to the critical components of a technology standard would result in a collectively non-profit-maximizing total royalty burden, given that each
patent holder will select the individually profit-maximizing rate. A monopolist would rationally eliminate this pricing inefficiency. The empirical strength of this theoretical objection depends closely on the extent to which, as a practical matter, patent holders actually do not take
into account the pricing behavior of other licensors. As I discuss subsequently, there is evidence to suggest that the most significant patentee-licensors in the smartphone market make
efforts to signal, and commit to, a total aggregate royalty burden. This behavior is consistent
with a theoretical model that takes into account repeat-play effects and signaling opportunities
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standard, 20 firms account for an estimated 85.5% of all SEP families; and
in the 5G standard-setting process, 20 firms account (so far) for an estimat76
ed 65.2% of all SEP families. The Table below shows the percentage ownership shares of SEP families relating to the 4G/LTE and 5G standards, illustrating the extent to which those contributions are dispersed among
multiple holders.

Table 2: Owners of Largest Estimated Portfolios of StandardEssential Patent Families 77
FIRM

ESTIMATED %
LTE/4G-RELATED
SEP FAMILIES

ESTIMATED %
5G-RELATED
SEP FAMILIES

Qualcomm
Huawei
LG
Ericsson
Samsung
Nokia
ZTE
Intel
Alcatel-Lucent
NTT DOCOMO
NEC
Sony
ETRI
Sharp
Panasonic

9.41%
9.88%
6.13%
6.58%
13.49%
8.74%
1.4%
—
1.12%
4.28%
1.56%
1.12%
1.2%
2.14%
2.08%

8.6%
7.92%
7.38%
6.74%
5.77%
78
3.48%
4.1%
3.04%
2.06%
2.61%
1.91%
1.75%
1.7%
1.69%
1.47%

in an iterative standardization framework. Barnett, Has the Academy, supra note 14; see infra
notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
76.
See Tim Pohlmann (IPlytics GmbH), Industry report – Who will be the technology
leader for 5G? Part two, IAM, July 18, 2018 (explaining ownership of 5G-related patent families) [hereinafter Pohlmann, Part two]; WORLD IP REPORT supra note 16, at 111 fig. 4.9 (illustrating ownership of 4G/LTE-related patent families). Note that a “patent family” refers to
a group of patents issued in multiple countries but relating to a single invention by a single
inventor (or group of inventors). There may be differences between the methodologies used to
calculate ownership of 5G and 4G/LTE-related patent families, although I note that the WIPO
source relies on the “IPlytics” database that is also the source for the 5G data presented above.
77.
See supra note 73. Note that a firm without an entry in a particular column indicates that, with respect to the relevant patent family, the firm did not rank among the “top 20”
patent owners.
78.
Does not include patents acquired by Nokia in acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent in
2016.
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InterDigital
MediaTek
Motorola
79
Google
Texas Instruments
Siemens
80
Others
Total (Top 20 only)
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1.29%
1.12%
1.08%
0.79%
0.71%
—
—
—
65.21%

Scholars and policymakers tend to view the dispersed ownership of IP
rights as a vice rather than a virtue. Specifically, conventional wisdom tends
to view dispersed patent ownership as a source of transactional friction in
the form of “patent thickets” and related transactional obstacles that can
limit access to technology inputs, raise end-user prices, and generally im81
pede the innovation and commercialization process. At least in the ICT
context, this broad-brush assumption overlooks the critical role played by
patents in reducing the expropriation risk that might otherwise frustrate value-enhancing exchanges of intellectual assets among potentially adverse
third parties. Specifically, patent rights support the vertically specialized
structure of the wireless communications market, in which upstream chip
design firms earn returns on R&D investment through licensing relationships with a broad base of downstream firms that execute the production,
assembly, and distribution functions that are necessary to embody R&D in
82
consumption goods for the relevant end-user market. This disaggregated
structure has several attractive economic characteristics: (i) it promotes the
efficient specialization of labor across technology markets; (ii) it enables
entry at discrete portions of the supply chain; and (iii) it promotes the distribution of technology assets among a broad pool of producers and assem79.
Google’s ownership of 4G/LTE-related patents appears to be a result of its acquisition of Motorola Mobility in 2011. Google sold Motorola Mobility to Lenovo in 2014. See
WORLD IP REPORT, supra note 16, at 111 fig. 4.9.
80.
These entities include the Institute of Telecommunications Science and Technology
and China Academy of Telecommunications Technology. See id. These appear to be Chinese
governmental research institutes.
81.
For the leading source of this view, see Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 13. For a
critical review of the large follow-on literature among scholars and policymakers, see Sidak,
Hoax, supra note 14, at 435-45; Barnett, Has the Academy, supra note 14, at 1338-56
82.
For extensive discussion of this point, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 838-53 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett, Intellectual Property] (providing case study of “fabless” semiconductor chip industry and
showing how patents facilitate specialization); Jonathan M. Barnett, Three Quasi-Fallacies in
the Conventional Understanding of Intellectual Property, 12 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 18-20
(2016) [hereinafter Barnett, Three Quasi-Fallacies] (providing theoretical argument that patents facilitate entry and specialization by lowering costs of informational exchange).
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blers. To the extent that upstream innovators are not engaged in the downstream segments of the supply chain, cannot independently deliver the entire
package of technology inputs required to produce a smartphone or similar
device, and face a positive rate of technological or commercial obsolescence, they tend to have incentives to extract revenues by licensing their IP
assets as broadly as possible to downstream intermediate users. Contrary to
the standard assumption that IP rights increase the transaction costs of informational exchange, secure patents enable licensing by permitting upstream innovator-firms to securely transmit valuable intellectual assets to
downstream users upon agreed-upon terms of use. This structure not only
delivers remunerative streams that support upstream R&D but enables a
broad pool of downstream firms to compete in the production, assembly and
distribution stages of the supply chain. Counterintuitively, patents can lower
entry costs by facilitating access to the technology inputs required by production specialists and other downstream firms that lack comparable internal R&D capacities.
The actual performance of the smartphone market is consistent with this
enabling view of IP rights. As Kirti Gupta and Keith Mallinson have shown
separately, the wireless device market has consistently exhibited robust en83
try rates , a result inconsistent with the view that high levels of patent issuance act as an exorbitant “tax” that increases costs and discourages entry.
The Figure below illustrates two trends in the smartphone market during
2007-16, each of which is consistent with the view that high patent intensity
is consistent with high competitive intensity: (i) market leadership has regularly changed hands, and (ii) the portion of the market apparently constituted by smaller firms (defined as firms that likely have less than 5% market
84
share individually in each year of the 2007-16 period ) has steadily increased. Over a 10-year period, the initial leading manufacturers in the
2G/GSM market (Ericsson, Nokia, and Motorola) have exited. Even Apple’s and Samsung’s current dominance in the 3G and 4G markets is relatively recent (as of 2007, each represented less than 5% of the global mar85
ket). Chinese entrants, which can secure the necessary IP inputs through

83.
See Kirti Gupta, Technology Standards and Competition in the Mobile Wireless
Industry, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 865, 893-94 (2015); Keith Mallinson, Don’t Fix What Isn’t
Broken: The Extraordinary Record of Innovation and Success in the Cellular Industry Under
Existing Licensing Practices, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 967, 989 (2016).
84.
More specifically, the Figure refers to “unidentified” firms, which reflects the percentage of the market that is not accounted for by the IDC Worldwide Mobile Phone Tracker
data reported in Dedrick & Kraemer, supra note 1, at 4. Given that the IDC data covers firms
in declining order from large to small market shares, it seems reasonable to presume that unidentified suppliers are most likely firms with trivial market shares, although this cannot be
definitively confirmed.
85.
Note that Apple’s and Samsung’s share of the market increases substantially if
measured as a percentage of revenues, rather than units shipped, reflecting the fact that Apple
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86

licenses from upstream innovator-firms such as Qualcomm and MediaTek ,
are rapidly accruing market share. Huawei, Xiaomi, and Oppo each entered
the market on or after 2010 and, as of 2017 (not shown in the graph below),
collectively accounted for almost 25% of the global market and individually
were the second, fourth and fifth largest manufacturers of smartphones
87
worldwide (based on number of units shipped).

targets the “higher-end” smartphone market almost entirely and Samsung targets it in part. See
id. at 5.
86.
See id. at 4.
87.
For source for data through 2016, see Dedrick & Kraemer, supra note 1, at 4. For
source for data through 2018, see
Smartphone Market Share, IDC,
https://www.idc.com/promo/smartphone-market-share/vendor (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
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Figure 1: Market Shares of Global Smartphone Sales
(2007-2016, units shipped) 88
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88.
Dedrick & Kraemer, supra note 1, at 5 tbl. 3 (citing IDC Worldwide Mobile Phone
Tracker).
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2. Collusion Risk
Cooperative standardization exhibits a notable defect as compared to
standardization by a government or private monopolist. As has been extensively addressed, there is an inherent concern that participant-firms in a cooperative standardization process will collusively select a standard in order
to erect a barrier or other competitive disadvantage for non-participating
89
firms. In the simplest case, a standardization consortium may select a
technology that is incompatible with non-participants’ products, which will
be effectively excluded from the market in the event the standard secures
market adoption and, due to network effects, users then abandon noncompatible products. Those types of claims have been alleged in a handful
of antitrust litigations brought by firms whose technology was not selected
90
by an SSO in a particular industry.
While collusion risk is inherent to cooperative standard-setting, there
are both internal and external forces that can mitigate this risk. On the internal side, SSOs can mitigate collusion risk through open or semi-open mem91
bership and governance policies. Hence, in one of the litigations described
above, the court noted favorably that two leading SSOs “provide an open
and public standard-setting process, in which all competitors in the market
have equal access to the same information at the same time . . . .” and then
noted disfavorably that the allegedly anticompetitive consortium had adopt92
ed limited membership rules that excluded certain competitors. On the external side, collusion risk can be mitigated to the extent there is competition
between the cooperative standard-setting entity and other such entities (or
other firms seeking to set a standard independently), in which case the

89.
For representative contributions in the economics literature (which address similar
collusion issues in the context of patent pools), see Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Public Policy
Toward Patent Pools, in 8 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, (Adam B. Jaffe et al.
eds., 2008); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 94 AMER. ECON. REV. 691,
706 (2004). In the legal literature, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 35-8 to -9
(3rd ed. 2017).
90.
See, e.g., GSI Tech. Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., No. 5:11-CV-03613EJD, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9378 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015) (declining to grant summary
judgment in favor of a SSO that comprised the relevant market’s dominant firms, which had
allegedly used the standard-setting process to exclude the plaintiff’s technology for anticompetitive purposes); TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., 844 F.Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.
Pa. 2012) (finding that, at summary judgment stage, plaintiff had not brought sufficient evidence to show that other members of SSO may have rejected plaintiff’s technology through a
“common plan”); Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2008)
(finding that, at summary judgment stage, plaintiff had not brought sufficient evidence to
show that other members of SSO had conspired to exclude plaintiff’s technology from the
standard), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1216 (2009).
91.
Subsequently I discuss this point in greater detail. See infra Part III.C.
92.
GSI Technology Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., No. 5:11-CV-03613-EJD,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9378 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015).
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standard-setting entity is at least initially subject to some discipline by mar93
ket forces. This appears to be a typical case. An illustration is provided by
the standardization process for the 3G wireless communications network.
During the late 1990s, European suppliers lobbied for two competing standards (W-CDMA and TD-CDMA) for the 3G network, ultimately agreeing
on a common standard (known as “UMTS”) that incorporated elements of
each, and, together with SSOs from other regions of the world, formed the
94
3GPP as the SSO to govern the standard-setting process. Concurrently,
Qualcomm, which held the largest single portfolio of CDMA-related patents, advocated for an alternative 3G standard known as “cdma2000”, gov95
erned by a rival U.S.-based SSO known as “3GPP2”. As the market moved
toward launch of the 3G network, three competing SSOs operated concurrently (3GPP, 3GPP2 and IEEE) and the market ultimately converged upon
96
the LTE standard managed by 3GPP.

D. Summary and Evaluation
To summarize, we can make three observations as a presumptive matter—meaning, these are general expectations concerning the comparative
welfare effects of paradigm standard mechanisms, which could therefore be
rebutted in particular cases. First, as compared to government standardization, both standardization by a single firm or by cooperative action is likely
to outperform insofar as standard selection is undertaken by firms that operate in a competitive environment, rather than government regulators that are
insulated from market discipline. Second, as compared to standardization by
a single firm, cooperative standardization is likely to perform equally well
for purposes of standard selection, so long as the standard-setting entity
must initially engage in a standards competition with other entities. Even in
the less typical case in which no such standards competition takes place, the
cooperative entity remains subject to some degree of market discipline insofar as it must secure adoption by downstream users. Third, again as compared to standardization by a single firm, cooperative standardization is
likely to outperform in standard implementation to the extent that ownership
of the technology inputs required to implement the standard are diffused
across multiple firms, which is likely to result in an economically attractive
market structure in which upstream R&D-specialist firms license technolo93.
See Delimatsis, supra note 35, at 7 (“[C]ompetition not only among firms but also
among standard-setting groups constitutes a typical feature of private standard-setting”).
94.
See Rudi Bekkers & Joel West, The Limits to IPR Standardization Policies as Evidenced by Strategic Patenting in UMTS, 33 TELECOMM. POLICY 80, 82 (2009); Kirti Gupta,
How SSOs Work: Unpacking the Mobile Industry’s 3GPP Standards, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND
PATENTS 29, 32-33 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018).
95.
See Bekkers & West, supra note 91, at 82; Gupta, supra note 91, at 32-33.
96.
See Gupta, supra note 94, at 32-33.

Michigan Technology Law Review

192

[Vol. 25:163

gy inputs to a broad base of downstream producers and other intermediate
97
users.

Table 3: Presumptive Efficiency Ranking of
Standardization Mechanisms
Standardization Stage

Gov’t
Standardization

Monopoly
Standardization

Cooperative
Standardization

Standard Selection

Less preferred

More preferred

More preferred

Standard Implementation

Less preferred

More preferred

Most preferred

III. Legal Preconditions for Cooperative Standardization
The discussion above has identified a set of circumstances in which cooperative standardization is likely to match or outperform standardization
by governmental and private monopolist entities for purposes of both standard selection and standard implementation. In this Part, I describe the legal
inputs that are required to support this economically attractive paradigm.
Specifically, I identify a medley of legal inputs—robust patent protection,
quasi-contractual licensing commitments, and surgical antitrust safeguards—that are necessary to execute three tasks in achieving standardization outcomes through cooperative mechanisms: (i) to induce innovators to
invest significant sums in “standard-relevant” R&D and then contribute the
resulting output for purposes of standard selection in spite of the inability to
exert sole control over the standard; (ii) following standard selection, to induce intermediate users to make the investments required to adopt and implement the new standard in spite of hold-up risk; and (iii) to mitigate the

97.
There is one respect in which market standardization may possibly underperform
relative to government standardization. If multiple firms are competing to become the standardization monopolist, then the firms may expend an aggregate sum in excess of the social
value generated through the standards competition. This is an application of the more general
observation that “innovation races” with winner-take-all reward structures can yield net welfare losses due to collectively excessive R&D expenditures. However, any such social loss
must be weighed against several offsetting social gains, including: (i) increased innovation
incentives under a winner-take-all relative to a split-reward contest, (ii) “runner-up” innovators’ R&D expenditures may yield valuable follow-on applications, and (iii) allocating a single reward provides the winner with the exclusivity required to negotiate and contract for efficient transactions with partners in the commercialization process. For analysis of these issues,
see Vincenzo Denicolò & Luigi A. Franzoni, Rewarding Innovation Efficiently: The Case for
Exclusive Rights, in COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
REGULATING INNOVATION 287 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2011); Vincenzo Denicolò & Luigi A. Franzoni, On the Winner-Take-All Principle in Innovation Races,
8 J. EURO. ECON. ASSOC. 1133 (2008).
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collusion risk that is inherent to cooperative standard-setting interactions
among actual and potential competitors.

A. The R&D Funding Problem
So far, I have considered various alternatives by which two steps in the
standardization process can be achieved: (i) establishment of a technology
standard that supports product interoperability; and (ii) adoption of that
standard by intermediate and end-users in the relevant product market. This
discussion has abstracted away from two predicate steps that must be completed (and have been overlooked in much recent discussion of SSOs): (i)
firms and other entities that specialize in innovation must be induced to
make the necessary investments in R&D to advance development of a new
standard; and (ii) those firms must be induced to disclose and contribute the
output of those R&D investments toward development of a common standard over which no individual firm will exert control. The following graphic
depicts the full standardization timeline:

Figure 2: Standardization Timeline
(2) Disclose and contribute R&D output
toward standard development

(4) Adopt and implement standard in consumption goods

It is
important
to keep in mind (3) Specify and agree upon
(1)
Make
standard-relevant
technology standard
R&D investments

In 2017, the three leading innovator-firms in the smartphone supply
chain made the following R&D investments: Qualcomm expended $5.74
billion in R&D costs, representing 21.7% of its revenues, Nokia expended
$4.8 billion in R&D costs, representing 18.4% of revenues, and Ericsson
98
expended $4.39 billion in R&D costs, representing 14.2% of revenues.
Broadly speaking, there are three possible mechanisms by which to fund the
large investments that are required to support R&D in wireless communications and other ICT markets. First, the state can fund these activities using
tax-supported financing. This mechanism is not widely observed in contem99
porary U.S. ICT markets, although it was an important component of the
98.
Data derived from WORLD IP REPORT, supra note 18, at 97 tbl. 4.3. Euro values in
original source converted into U.S. dollars at current exchange rates.
99.
This statement does not apply to the European market, where the European Commission provided extensive funding for early development of the GSM and UMTS telecom-
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postwar U.S. innovation economy, in which government funding extensively supported defense-related computing and communications research by
100
the country’s largest technology firms. Second, consortia or other groups
of firms or other entities can collectively fund and undertake R&D efforts.
This model is not common in contemporary wireless communications and
101
other ICT markets, although it has been used more widely in Japan. Third,
firms can independently fund and undertake R&D. This is the most commonly observed structure for funding and performing R&D in contemporary
wireless technology and other ICT markets, and the remainder of this discussion will focus on this funding mechanism.
Empirical studies generally support the view that the necessity for IP
protection to support R&D activity varies across industries and, within in102
dustries, across firm types. Landmark survey studies, conducted by the
“Levin et al.” and “Cohen et al.” research teams respectively in the late
1980s and late 1990s, which targeted R&D managers at large firms in a variety of industries, found that the value placed on patent protection was
103
strongest among pharmaceutical and chemical firms , while the Berkeley
Patent Survey, which surveyed start-ups and smaller firms in the mid-2000s,
found that the demand for IP was strongest among biotechnology, medical
104
device, and IT hardware firms. A complementary body of scholarship has
identified compelling theoretical reasons, informed by empirical evidence,
that IT firms that adopt R&D-intensive models rely especially heavily on
patents in order to support licensing models that enable those firms to earn

munications standards, corresponding to what are also known as 2G and 3G networks. See
Bekkers & West, supra note 91, at 81.
100.
See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Great Patent Grab (Working Paper, 2019) (on file
with the Michigan Technology Law Review).
101.
On Japanese research consortia in computing and electronics markets, see Bresnahan & Malerba, supra note 60, at 104-06. Additionally, South Korea and Taiwan have funded
public research institutes that have played a role in technology transfer in the consumer electronics industries. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Patent Tigers: The New Geography of Global Innovation, 2 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 429, 465-66, 476-477 (2017).
102.
For discussion, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Do Patents Matter? Empirical Evidence
on the Incentive Thesis, in HANDBOOK IN LAW, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 178, 180 (Robert
E. Litan ed. 2011) (stating that “the incentive effects of patent protection vary considerably
(and, at some reasonable level of approximation, systematically) across industries and across
firm types”).
103.
See Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patents (Or Not), (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns
from Industrial R&D, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783. For extensive discussion of the relevant empirical literature, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of
Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1257-69 (2004) [hereinafter Barnett, Private
Protection].
104.
See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1255, 1261-63,
1278-83 (2009).
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returns on R&D investment without incurring the costs and acquiring the
expertise required to vertically integrate forward into downstream produc105
tion and distribution functions.
This existing body of empirical and theoretical scholarship suggests
that, in general, the demand for IP protection in the IT market will tend to
vary substantially across the following firm types or organizational structures:
Type I: A vertically integrated firm that can independently execute all
functions of the supply chain. Demand for IP is relatively weak because the
firm operates a “stand-alone” supply chain and therefore does not require IP
rights to mediate informational exchanges with third-party suppliers. So
long as competitors bear sufficiently high reverse-engineering costs or the
market exhibits a sufficiently rapid rate of product obsolescence, this firm
may be able to earn a substantial return on its R&D investment in a weak-IP
environment. A likely example of this type of firm is Intel, which maintains
a vertically integrated structure for chip innovation and design, production,
and distribution.
Type II: A firm that employs an “IP giveaway” strategy in which an informational asset is distributed at no charge to promote sales in an excludable complementary goods market in which the firm has a competitive advantage. Demand for IP will then be weak or even “negative”. An example
of this type of firm is Google, which distributes content at no charge to users in order to extract data it can deliver to paying advertisers. As reflected
by its litigation and lobbying strategies, Google consistently prefers weaker
106
to zero forms of IP protection over content assets.
Type III: A firm that (i) specializes in R&D and lacks production and
other commercialization functions, (ii) has no competitive advantage in an
excludable complementary goods market, and (iii) earns a return on its
R&D investments through licensing relationships with intermediate users.
Demand for IP will be strong. An example of this type of firm is Qualcomm, which specializes in chip design, largely relies on outside “foundries” for production functions, and earns the bulk of its profits by licensing
107
its patent-protected technologies to device manufacturers.

105.
For extensive discussion of these points, see Barnett, Intellectual Property, supra
note 79, at 811-29; Barnett, Three Quasi-Fallacies, supra note 79, at 18-20.
106.
See Barnett, Costs of Free, supra note 42, at 1104-06.
107.
In 2016, Qualcomm earned 33% of its revenues, but 75% of its earnings before taxes from semiconductor licensing (which operated through its “QTL” entity, as distinguished
from the sale of physical chipsets through its “QCT” entity). Author’s calculations based on
revenue and earnings before taxes disclosed in Qualcomm Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K),
at 46. (Nov. 7, 2016). The disparity between revenues and profits (as measured by earnings
before taxes) reflects the low marginal costs incurred by Qualcomm in each licensing transaction, as compared with chipset sales.
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The firms that are widely viewed as having made the most fundamental
contributions to the development of the 3G and 4G wireless communications standards (and are continuing to make substantial contributions to the
108
emergent 5G standard ), such as Ericsson, Nokia and Qualcomm, mostly
fall into the Type III category. Qualcomm conforms closely to this idealized
model since it has largely withdrawn from the production segment of the
supply chain, while Nokia and Ericsson conform approximately since they
109
retain some production and distribution functions. Without adequate patent security, it is unlikely that these R&D-specialist firms would be prepared either (i) as a first step, to disclose their technology assets to horizon110
tal competitors that participate in the SSO process or (ii) as a second step,
to engage in vertical licensing relationships with the downstream manufacturers and assemblers on which they rely in order to reach the end-user market. Consistent with the proposed relationship between R&D incentives,
disclosure incentives and patent protection, the Table below shows that
firms that have made the ten largest number of technical submissions to
SSOs in connection with the 5G network generally exhibit high levels of
R&D intensity (R&D as a percentage of sales) and have some of the largest
patent portfolios relating to these standards. While not dispositive, this is
consistent with theoretical expectations that secure patent protections support firms’ incentives to engage in standard-relevant R&D and then disclose
at least some of the resulting R&D output for purposes of the standardsetting process.

108.
See supra Table 2.
109.
For discussion of these firms’ production and distribution functions, see Annual
Report,
ERICSSON
(2017)
https://www.ericsson.com/assets/local/investors/documents/2017/ericsson-annual-report2017-en.pdf; Nokia Corp., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Mar. 23, 2017); Qualcomm Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Nov. 27, 2018).
110.
On the risks associated with disclosure during the standardization process, see
BLIND, supra note 24, at 99-100; Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan B. Noroozi, Why Incentives
for “Patent Holdout” Threaten to Dismantle FRAND, and Why It Matters, 32 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. 1381, 1394 (2017).
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Table 4: Technical Contributions, Patenting and R&D Activity
of Firms Most Substantially Involved in 5G Standardization 111
FIRM

% TECHNICAL
SUBMISSIONS TO 5G
SSO PROCESS (2018)

% 5G-RELATED
PATENT
FAMILIES

R&D
INTENSITY

(2017)

(2018)
Huawei
Nokia
Ericsson
ZTE
Qualcomm
Intel
Samsung
LG
China Mobile
AT&T

11.93%
10.31%
8.16%
5.84%
5.06%
3.62%
3.47%
3.07%
3.03%
1.12%

7.92%
3.48%
6.74%
4.1%
8.6%
3.04%
5.77%
7.38%
n/a
n/a

14.9%
18.2%
18.8%
11.9%
23.8%
20.9%
5.7%
5.4%
112
5.1%
113
n/a

It might nonetheless be argued that, even absent secure patent protection, Type I and II firms would still have sufficient revenue streams to support substantial investments in R&D, which can then be monetized either
through a vertically integrated production and distribution infrastructure
(Type I) or by cross-subsidizing sales of an excludable complementary good
(Type II). Certainly, royalty-free giveaway structures have been used for
some standard-setting initiatives (for example, the Bluetooth and USB
114
standards as well as the Android operating system in the wireless device
115
market ), typically involving firms that seek to earn returns through the

111.
For technical contributions, see Tim Pohlmann, Who will be the technology leader
for 5G? Part one, IAM, July 11, 2018 [hereinafter Pohlmann, Part one]. For patent families,
see Pohlmann, Part two, supra note 73. For R&D intensity (R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales) see the author’s calculations, based on information in each company’s 2017 annual report. “N/a” refers to the non-availability of the relevant informational item in the
“Pohlmann” sources. Given that those sources identify the “top 20” firms with respect to
technical contributions or patent ownership, this implies that firms for which “n/a” is indicated (specifically, AT&T and China Mobile) were not especially active in the relevant category.
112.
This may overstate the firm’s R&D expenditures because the firm’s annual report
aggregates “operations support and research and development expenditures”.
113.
AT&T does not appear to report its R&D expenditures separately.
114.
These technologies do not assess a royalty but do require payment of relatively
modest lump-sum fees. For further information, see Qualification Fees, BLUETOOTH,
https://www.bluetooth.com/develop-with-bluetooth/qualification-listing/qualification-listingfees (last visited Nov. 2, 2018); Getting a Vendor ID, USB, https://www.usb.org/gettingvendor-id (last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
115.
While Android is distributed on a royalty-free basis, Google conditions access to
advance releases of updated versions of Android on an agreement by the device maker or telecom carrier to preinstall certain Google applications and provide those applications with pref-
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sale of excludable complementary goods and services that rely on the “give116
away” technology. However, this argument suffers from two deficiencies.
First, it overlooks the fact that these giveaway arrangements provide the
best evidence that, even under a robust IP regime, IP owners may have
compelling business reasons to waive their IP rights. Second, it rests on the
implausible assumption that all mechanisms for funding and monetizing
R&D are equally efficient in all markets at all points in time, in which case
effectively mandating that firms monetize R&D through vertical integration
or cross-subsidization strategies is innocuous or a net gain from a social
welfare perspective. A weak-patent regime would distort the market’s selection of R&D-monetization structures by endangering the viability of Type
III firms and, as a result, at least sometimes compelling firms to adopt less
than maximally efficient structures for supporting and commercializing innovation.
This organizational distortion (which favors Type I and II structures
over Type III structures for innovation and commercialization) is liable to
give rise to two related social costs that, in the aggregate, degrade affected
117
markets’ competitive vigor. First, as compared to a Type III structure,
Type I and II structures tend to inflate the capital and expertise requirements
for viable competitive entry given that entrants must either vertically integrate forward (Type I) or enter the market at two or more points in order to
establish a competitive position in an excludable complementary goods
market (Type II). Second, as vertically integrated operations, Type I firms
may have no rational incentive to license their technology to other manufacturers and assemblers (unlike Type III firms, which typically have every reason to do so) insofar as they directly compete against those firms in the target product or services market. Contrary to standard intuitions, a weak-IP
regime may induce R&D-monetization and standardization structures that
pose higher entry barriers and result in reduced dissemination of technology
inputs to intermediate users, relative to the structural mix that would emerge
under a stronger IP regime in which firms could select from a broader range
of organizational options.

B. The Implementation Problem
Successful execution of the standard-setting process requires that a
broad range of firms, including in particular entities that specialize in innoerential display treatment. See Ben Edelman, Google, Mobile and Competition: The Current
State of Play, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L Jan. 2017, at 1, 1.
116.
See Barnett, Host’s Dilemma, supra note 41, at 1890 (noting that platform owners
can generate revenues by giving away access to the platform, which then drives sales of excludable complementary goods); id. at 1910-13 (showing how corporate sponsors fund opensource operating systems in order to drive demand for complementary proprietary services).
117.
For further discussion of these points, see Barnett, Intellectual Property, supra note
79, at 854-56; Barnett, Three Quasi-Fallacies, supra note 79, at 18-20.
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vation and entities that specialize in implementation, have rational incentives to make adequate investments at their respective points of specialization on the standardization timeline. In the smartphone market, it is necessary to support both (i) upstream firms’ incentives to develop chip designs
for integration into a technology standard, and (ii) downstream firms’ incentives to embed those chip designs in computing and communications devices for distribution to end-users. The discussion above showed that patents
are likely to be necessary predicates for inducing innovation by R&Dspecialist firms that mostly lack downstream commercialization capacities.
As has been emphasized in scholarly and policy commentary, however, patents may deter implementation by manufacturers and other intermediate
users who anticipate that IP owners will opportunistically demand “excessive” royalties once those users have made irrevocable investments in
118
adopting the standard. Without adequate assurance against this hold-up
threat, downstream firms will decline to adopt the standardized technology.
By anticipation, the upstream firm will decline to make the R&D investments required to develop the standard (unless it has, or can acquire at a
feasible cost, production and distribution capacities in order to vertically integrate forward through market release). Hence, a solution to this secondstep implementation problem is necessary to resolve the first-step R&D
funding problem.

1. Re-Understanding the Holdup Problem
The holdup problem in the context of wireless device markets is typically characterized as a problem from the perspective of downstream implementer firms who, once having adopted a standard, are exposed to opportunistic behavior on the part of upstream IP owners that threaten to withhold
technology that is critical to the standard. This characterization overlooks
the fact that upstream innovators are also exposed to opportunism—namely,
by downstream implementers, who have a difficult-to-replicate production
and distribution infrastructure as well as, in some cases, a difficult-toreplicate brand in the relevant end-user market. Recall that holdup risk arises in any situation in which one party must make an irrevocable investment
that has no or lesser value elsewhere and there is no contractual solution by
which the investing party can fully specify and deter opportunistic action by
the counterparty. These conditions are satisfied in the case of an upstream
innovator, who incurs substantial R&D costs starting several years prior to
finalization of the standard-setting process, under substantial uncertainty

118.
For commonly cited sources in the legal literature, see Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things
to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not to), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149 (2007); Mark
A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991
(2007). For similar views expressed in reports and policy statements issued by antitrust regulators, see supra note 15.
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concerning which standard will ultimately be selected or the commercial
applications of the selected standard, and with no feasible opportunity to
negotiate with downstream firms for purposes of implementing a still119
emergent technology. Upstream firms’ R&D investments can easily prove
to be mostly in vain: out of all contributions made by firms in the course of
the 3G and 4G standard-setting processes, only 30% were ultimately incor120
porated into the standard. Data on the relatively low percentages of a
firm’s technical contributions that have been accepted for inclusion in the
5G standard (ranging from 29.2% to 41.5% for the 10 leading contribu121
tors) similarly illustrate the stiff challenges, and high risk of zero returns
on R&D investments, faced by innovator entities. These observations have a
key implication. While innovators may be overcompensated by holding up
intermediate users that have incurred substantial adoption costs and do not
easily have access to any comparable technology inputs, it is just as plausible that innovators may be undercompensated given that the bulk of their
R&D investments takes place well before initiating licensing discussions
with intermediate users.

2. Re-Understanding the “FRAND” Commitment
Both innovator and implementer firms in wireless communications
markets have sought to allay holdup concerns by agreeing upon certain li122
censing principles in connection with standard implementation. Specifically, contributors of technology inputs toward a standard typically commit
to disclose all “essential” patents relating to the standard and to license
those patents on a “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (“FRAND”)
123
basis. It is often lamented that the FRAND slogan lacks any objective
content and is therefore liable to give rise to either hold-up behavior by IP
124
owners or litigation between IP owners and implementers. The proposed
119.
See Kappos, supra note 10; Gupta, supra note 91, at 32-33, 42; Damien Geradin &
Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent
Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EURO. COMPETITION L. J. 101, 106
(2015).
120.
See Gupta, supra note 94, at 42.
121.
See Pohlmann, Part one, supra note 108.
122.
To be clear, this is not the only purpose of the FRAND requirement. Subsequently
I discuss historical evidence indicating that, at least at its inception, the FRAND requirement
was advocated by European telecom carriers in order to mitigate the anticipated increase in
input costs arising from the movement away from protected markets dominated by national
monopolies to a more competitive environment in which certain technology inputs would be
supplied by outside providers. See infra notes 226-34 and accompanying text.
123.
See C. Bradford Biddle, No Standard for Standards: Understanding the ICT Standards-Development Ecosystem, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL
STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 25 (Jorge L. Contreras
ed., 2018).
124.
See, e.g., Geradin & Rato, supra note 119, at 112; Timothy S. Simcoe & Allan L.
Shampine, Economics of Patents and Standardization: Network Effects, Hold-Up, Hold-Out,
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solution is for the parties to agree to a more fully specified FRAND commitment—for example, a fully specified royalty rate or at least a royalty rate
125
cap. Antitrust regulators in the U.S. (at least prior to the recent policy shift
126
at the DOJ, as discussed below ) and Europe have endorsed these types of
127
policy actions in various communications in 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2015.
These remarkably uniform policy signals have given some SSOs sufficient
legal comfort to impose royalty caps or close equivalents in connection with
the FRAND commitment. In 2006, the VMEbus International Trade Association (“VITA”), an SSO organized in connection with the “VMEbus”
computer bus standard, adopted a policy requiring that a firm disclose its
maximum royalty rates and most restrictive non-royalty terms prior to inclu128
sion of the firm’s technology in the standard. This policy was reviewed
favorably by the DOJ as part of the “business review letter” process (a type
129 130
of pre-clearance review ). In 2015, the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”), a leading SSO associated with the 802.11 WiFi
standard, adopted two critical changes to its FRAND policy: (i) SEP holders
may not seek injunctions against potential licensees unless the licensee
Stacking, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW:
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 111 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018).
125.
See id. at 114-116; Gil Ohana and C. Bradford Biddle, The Disclosure of Patents
and Licensing Terms in Standards Development, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 256-58
(Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018).
126.
See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
127.
For examples of U.S. antitrust regulators’ endorsement of the practice, see Renata
B. Hesse, Ass’t Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Response to Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (Feb. 2, 2015); Thomas O. Barnett, Asst. Att’y Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Response to VMEbus International Trade Association
(VITA)’s Request for Business Review Letter (Oct. 30, 2006); Thomas O. Barnett, Asst. Att’y
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Response to Institute of Electrical and Electronics’ Engineers,
Inc.’s Request for Business Review Letter (Apr. 30, 2007). For an example of a European antitrust regulator’s endorsement of the practice, see Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for
Competition Policy, Setting the standards high, Address at Harvard Club of Belgium, “De
Warande”
Brussels
(Oct.
15,
2009),
https://www.montesquieuinstitute.eu/9353000/1/j9vvj72dlowskug/vi9cg60e6xxu?ctx=vh84exkkodyi&tab=1
(stating
that “competition law should not stand in the way . . . of unilateral ex ante disclosure of maximum royalty rates and the most restrictive licensing terms that would apply should a company’s technology be made the standard”).
128.
See Anne Layne-Farrar, Ex Ante Rate Disclosure in Tech Standards, A Decade Later, CRA INSIGHTS (Dec. 1, 2017, 12:07PM), http://www.crai.com/publication/ex-ante-ratedisclosure-tech-standards-decade-later; Ohana & Biddle, supra note 125, at 256. For the actual policy, see VITA STANDARDS ORG., VSO POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 10.3.2 (2015).
129.
The DOJ’s Antitrust Division issues these letters pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §50.6. For
an explanation, see DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. BUS. REVIEW PROCEDURE (June 25,
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/28-cfr-section-506-antitrust-division-business-reviewprocedure.
130.
See Thomas O. Barnett, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Antitrust Div., Response to VMEbus International Trade Association (VITA)’s Request for Business Review
Letter (Oct. 30, 2006).
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“fails to participate in, or to comply with the outcome of an adjudication”;
and (ii) SEP holders may not charge more than a reasonable royalty, which
must exclude the value attributable to inclusion of the technology in the
standard and “should include . . . consideration of the value the technology
131
contributes to the smallest saleable practicing unit.”
These policy changes (which effectively imposed a de facto cap on the
royalty rate that can be negotiated by SEP holders) were also reviewed fa132
vorably in a business review letter issued by the DOJ, and, as Gregory
Sidak has shown, reflected prior recommendations by DOJ Antitrust officials as early as 2012 and views advanced by prominent intermediate users
in the IT supply chain, such as Apple, Cisco, Intel, Samsung, and Mi133
crosoft.
The commonly held view that incompletely defined FRAND commitments are defective suffers from a critical oversight. Namely, it neglects the
possibility that the very ambiguity of the FRAND commitment may constitute an efficient term that arises out of negotiations between innovators and
implementers within the framework of the SSO process, which in turn reflects the parties’ mutual uncertainty concerning the range of applications
134
and commercial value of the relevant technology. In the case of ETSI, a
leading SSO in the 4G and 5G markets, it specifically rejected on two occasions (in 2003 and 2006) proposals to render the FRAND royalty commit135
ment in more precise terms. In 2007, ETSI published a document that
stated: “Specific licensing terms and negotiations are commercial issues be136
tween the companies and shall not be addressed by ETSI.” Given that innovator and implementer firms that are involved in the SSO process in wireless device markets are typically sophisticated entities with extensive
market experience across multiple standardization initiatives, it is appropri-

131.
See Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., IEEE-SA Standard Board
Bylaws 16-18 (2019), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf [hereinafter IEEE Bylaws].
132.
See Renata B. Hesse, supra note 124.
133.
See J. Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential
Patents, GEO. L. J. ONLINE 48, 49-52 (2015) [hereinafter Sidak, Devaluation].
134.
For related views, see Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 108, at 1396 (arguing that
ETSI’s 1994 FRAND policy was “deliberately vague, leaving flexibility for parties to bilaterally negotiate its meaning in the context of their particular circumstances”); Tsai & Wright,
supra note 51, at 163 (describing the FRAND commitment as an example of “intentional contractual incompleteness” and a choice made by “sophisticated parties”); Geradin & Rato, supra note 119, at 112 (stating that “it is the very absence of a definition mechanically translatable into concrete terms that bestows on the FRAND commitment the suppleness required
to . . . ensure the widest availability of the technology embodied in the standard”)).
135.
See Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 108, at 1396-97; Rogers G. Brooks & Damien
Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9 INT’L J. IT
STANDARDS AND STANDARDIZATION RES. 1, 10 (2011).
136.
See Brooks & Geradin, supra note 135, at 10 (citing ETSI, “Guide to IPRs”
(2007)).
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ate for outside observers to at least consider why the ambiguously formulated FRAND commitment may be efficient, rather than conclusively determining that it represents a market failure that calls for government intervention.
Specifically, there is reasonable ground to believe that the ambiguities
of the FRAND commitment constitute an efficient form of commitment in
an environment in which parties have limited information with respect to
the potential value and applications of an enabling technology at the onset
137
of standardization. Following the well-recognized tradeoff between the
marginal costs and gains of increased investment in contractual precision,
the uncertain content of the FRAND commitment may reflect parties’ forecasting, negotiating, and drafting costs at the onset of the standardization
process, rather than any strategic effort to preserve a hold-up option for IP
rights holders. As several scholars have proposed, the looseness of the
FRAND commitment, supplemented by reputational norms in a repeat-play
environment, may provide an efficient framework for future negotiation and
adjustment of royalty rates in response to circumstances that cannot be fore138
seen at the point of standardization. Reputational forces, as expressed
through market norms concerning royalty rates and related licensing terms,
may be especially potent in standard-setting environments in which a relatively small number of IP licensors and implementers routinely interact over
139
the course of the standard-setting process. Consistent with this possibility,
137.
On the difficulties in bargaining at an early stage over the commercial value of an
“enabling” technology, see David J. Teece, The “Tragedy of the Anticommons” Fallacy: A
Law and Economics Analysis of Patent Thickets and FRAND Licensing, 32 BERKELEY TECH.
L. J. 1489, 1521 (2017).
138.
In particular, Damien Geradin suggests that the incomplete specification of the
FRAND commitment may provide parties with valuable “suppleness” in structuring the licensor-licensee relationship going forward. See Damien Geradin, What’s Wrong with Royalties in
High-Technology Industries, in COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER
UNCERTAINTY 462, 476 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds., Cambridge University
Press 2011) [hereinafter Geradin, What’s Wrong with Royalties]; Damien Geradin, Standardization and Technological Innovation: Some Reflections on Ex-Ante Licensing, FRAND, and
the Proper Means to Reward Innovators, 39 WORLD COMPETITION 511, 532 (2006). Nicolas
Petit argues that FRAND commitments are not intended to specify a particular royalty rate but
rather, are designed to set up a structure for good-faith negotiations over royalty and nonroyalty terms of licensor-licensee relationships. See Nicolas Petit, EU Competition Law Analysis of FRAND Disputes, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION
LAW 290, 296-300 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2016). Richard Epstein and David Kappos have
argued that SEP-intensive markets implement the FRAND commitment largely through “informal mechanisms of dispute resolution” that are likely to “work far better than any systematic effort to judicialize or otherwise formalize the dispute resolution process in connection
with FRAND-encumbered patents.” See Richard A. Epstein & David J. Kappos, Legal Remedies for Patent Infringement: From General Principles to FRAND Obligations for Standard
Essential Patents, 9 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L Autumn 2013, at 69, 71.
139.
See Anne Layne-Farrar & Karen Wong-Ervin, Methodologies for Calculating
FRAND Damages: An Economic and Comparative Analysis of the Case Law From China, the
European Union, India, and the United States, JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. (2017) (stating that,
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leading IP holders in the smartphone market have periodically announced
commitments to “single-digit” (or, in one case, a 5%) aggregate royalty with
140
respect to the 3G and 4G platforms , which is within the range of aggregate royalty rates that have been subsequently estimated by empirical stud141
ies.

C. The Collusion Problem
Standardization by cooperative action is attractive from an efficiency
perspective insofar as it avoids the informational asymmetries and rentseeking distortions inherent to standard selection by government fiat as well
as the distorted pricing and output effects inherent to standard implementation by a private monopolist. However, there remains an important anticompetitive risk that is inherent to standardization by cooperative action:
namely, the risk that firms involved in cooperative standardization will use
that process to collude on price, output, or some other competitive parameter. There are at least three possibilities, which arise at both the time of
standard selection and the time of standard implementation: (i) the firms
that hold ownership interests in the technology assets required to implement
the standard may exclude competitors from access to those inputs (or may
set the standard in a manner that disadvantages certain competitors and effectively blocks access for those firms); (ii) participating firms may collude
over the royalty rates for use of the technology assets included in the standard, which may effectively exclude certain firms from accessing those inputs; or (iii) participating firms may collude over royalty rates in order to
indirectly collude over the price of the consumption goods in which the rel142
evant technology is embedded.

“because standards evolve over time . . . repeated interactions among the participants provide
strong behavioral incentives for good faith bargaining”); Knut Blind & Brian Kahin, Standards and the Global Economy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL
STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 7, 13-14 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018) (noting that most firms that participate in the standard-setting process are
repeat players and have incentives to avoid “disruptive behavior”); Epstein & Kappos, supra
note 138, at 79 (observing that repeat-play pressures may discourage IP licensors from acting
opportunistically).
140.
See Barnett, Has the Academy, supra note 14, at 1359-60 tbl. 2 (noting multiple
instances in which leading IP holders in the 3G and 4G smartphone market announced maximum cumulative royalty rates). On market announcements of anticipated royalty rates in the
5G market, see Richard Lloyd, Nokia reveals expected licensing rate for 5G phones, IAM,
(last updated Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/nokia-reveals-expectedlicensing-rate-5g-phones (reporting that leading IP licensors such as Nokia, Ericsson and
Qualcomm have announced maximum royalty rates, ranging in Qualcomm’s case up to 3.25%
of a device’s wholesale price).
141.
These studies are discussed subsequently, see infra note 155.
142.
The last scenario would only raise plausible competition concerns where (i) the
firms holding the technology inputs are vertically integrated forward into the production of
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Antitrust law has recognized that collective standardization efforts, and
especially collective licensing arrangements, raise concerns that these arrangements may be used to promote exclusionary strategies that protect incumbents from entry. At the same time, it is widely recognized that standard-setting can have pro-competitive effects insofar as doing so facilitates
interoperability, reduces transaction costs, and yields related efficiency
gains. This tradeoff has arisen in cases such as Allied Tube & Conduit Corp.
143
v. Indian Head, Inc. and American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc.
144
v. Hydrolevel Corp. , in which members of SSOs were alleged to have
manipulated the standard-setting process in order to exclude the plaintiff
from the relevant market. While the Standards Development Organization
145
Advancement Act of 2004 provides for “rule of reason” treatment for all
146
SSOs (which largely codified existing judicial tendencies ), antitrust precedent demands that collective standard-setting and licensing arrangements
adopt meaningful precautions to mitigate the risk of collusion and other an147
ti-competitive behavior. This middle-of-the-road approach follows a balancing analysis that trades off the anti-competitive risks that are inherent to
any form of interfirm cooperation against the pro-competitive benefits that
can arise from standardization by collective action.
In the information technology context, a leading source of guidance on
these matters is a series of “business review letters” issued by the DOJ’s
Antitrust Division, concerning patent pooling structures in the DVD, DVD148
ROM, MPEG-2, and 3G standards markets. For the sake of brevity, I will
focus on the letter issued by the DOJ in 1997 with respect to a collective licensing arrangement proposed by MPEG-LA, a pioneer in the organization
and administration of patent pools. The MPEG-LA business review letter
has provided a template for the construction and governance of patent pools

consumption goods embodying those inputs; and (ii) all other components of those consumption goods are substantially the same across all such firms.
143.
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 503 (1988).
144.
Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 576 (1982).
145.
15 U.S.C. §§ 4301, 4303 (2014).
146.
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988) (noting that most lower courts apply rule of reason standard to SSOs).
147.
See id. at 500-01 (noting that SSOs are inherently prone to collusive behavior and
should adopt “safeguards” such as basing standard-selection decisions on “objective expert
judgments and through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from being biased
by members with economic interests in stifling product competition”).
148.
Joel I. Klein, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Response to
MPEG LA, L.L.C. et al.’s Request for Business Review Letter (June 26, 1997) (MPEG-2);
Charles A. James, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Response to 3G Patent Platform Partnership’s Request for Business Review Letter (Nov. 12, 2002); Joel I. Klein,
Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept of Justice, Antitrust Div., Response to Hitachi et al.’s Request for
Business Review Letter (June 10, 1999) (DVD-ROM); Joel I. Klein, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Response to Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V. et al.’s Request for Business Review Letter (Dec. 16, 1998) (DVD).
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149

in the IT industry. While recognizing the collusive and other anticompetitive risks inherent to a collective licensing arrangement, the Division observed that the proposed arrangement (which sought to pool patents
held by multiple entities relating to the MPEG-2 “codec” standard for digital audio and video transmission) comprised several features to mitigate that
risk. These included: (i) the pool would be administered by a third-party entity with no business interest in the downstream product markets; (ii) all IP
rights in the pool would be available for licensing by any party willing to
pay the royalty fee; (iii) all licensees (including licensors in their capacity as
licensees) would pay a uniform royalty; and (iv) the pool would be restricted to patents deemed “essential” to the technology standard. Unlike the
“closed” pooling arrangements that were more commonly observed in the
th
150
early decades of the 20 century , the “MPEG LA” pool structure offers
licenses on uniform terms to the downstream population of manufacturers,
distributors, and other entities. Critically, given that upstream licensors must
pay royalties to the pool at the same rate as downstream licensees, there is a
reduced risk that licensors would have incentives to “unreasonably” inflate
royalty rates. Consistent with this expectation, the MPEG LA pool has
widely licensed its technology to device producers and other firms and,
based on preliminary estimates, imposes no more than a small to nominal
increase in the price of the end-user devices that are ultimately subject to the
151
pool’s patent portfolio.

IV. Undoing Cooperative Standardization
In the discussion above, I identified the attractive features of the hybrid
structure observed in the smartphone and related ICT markets, which have
achieved standardization through a collective mechanism that outperforms
standardization by government fiat as a matter of standard selection, matches standardization by a monopolist as a matter of standard selection (so long
as the SSO initially operates in competition with other standard-setting entities), and outperforms standardization by a monopolist as a matter of standard implementation. Additionally, I identified the institutional inputs that
sustain cooperative standardization in the smartphone and related ICT markets—specifically, reasonably secure patents, loosely defined quasicontractual licensing commitments, and antitrust safeguards that together
support R&D incentives, promote implementation, and mitigate collusion
risk. Based on these observations, we can now assess the antitrust and IP
policies relating to the smartphone and other ICT markets that have been

149.
See Jonathan M. Barnett, From Patent Thickets to Patent Networks: The Legal Infrastructure for the Digital Economy, 55 JURIMETRICS 1, 14-15, 15 n.40 (2015).
150.
Id. at 16-17.
151.
Id. at 43-45.
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implemented since approximately the mid-2000s by courts and antitrust
agencies in the U.S. and other major jurisdictions. The baseline conclusion
is straightforward: this international sequence of policy actions has placed at
risk the institutional underpinnings behind the collective standardization
mechanisms that have supported technological development and implementation in the smartphone and other ICT markets.

A. “Depropertizing” Standard-Essential Patents
Agencies and courts have devoted substantial attention to the potential
risk that holders of SEPs would be able to dictate “exorbitant” pricing or
impose other access constraints on device manufacturers in the wireless
communications markets. The dispersion of IP ownership interests naturally
gives rise to concerns that the total licensing and transaction costs involved
in assembling the IP package required to deploy a standard-dependent product will be so high (the so-called “royalty stack”) that prices for end-user
products will move beyond the reach of most consumers as well as discour152
age entry into the market by manufacturers and other intermediate users.
However plausible in theory, these arguments have not been supported by
actual market performance.
Two key pieces of empirical evidence suggest that these scenarios
should no longer be key areas of policy concern. First, empirical evidence
shows that, adjusted for quality improvements, the prices of smartphones
and other IT products that are dependent on SEPs have fallen both absolute153
ly and relative to products that are not dependent on SEPs. Second, empirical studies of aggregate royalty burdens in the smartphone markets have
found no evidence to support widely stated claims that device manufacturers
154
are burdened by double-digit royalty rates ; rather, the best available evi152.
For the most well-known statement of this assertion, see Lemley & Shapiro, supra
note 118. The same authors have made similar assertions together and separately in subsequent writings. See also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1149-50
(2013) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, A Simple Approach]; A. Douglas Melamed & Carl
Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L. J.
2110, 2116 (2018).
153.
Alexander Galetovic et al., An Empirical Examination of Patent Holdup, 11 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549, 572 (2015).
154.
See Ann Armstrong, et al., The Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones, 68-69 (May 29, 2014) (WilmerHale,
Working
Paper),
https://www.wilmerhale.com//media/ed1be41360634d1fa5c3ab08647e8ada.pdf (aggregating royalty estimates for leading
patent holders and arguing that “potential royalties demands on a smartphone could equal or
even exceed the cost of the device’s components,” but that “many of the so-called ‘headline’
rates on which these royalty figures are based may not withstand negotiation or litigation”);
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 118, at 2027 (describing sources supporting estimated total
royalty rates in excess of 30% for a dual-band smartphone). As I have observed elsewhere,
these types of estimates uniformly fail to take into account that licensors and licensees engage

208

Michigan Technology Law Review

[Vol. 25:163

dence indicates that total royalty rates are typically in the low to mid-single
155
digits. These findings are broadly consistent with general tendencies in
the smartphone markets, which have exhibited remarkable rates of growth
156
in output and market adoption and continuous entry into the device pro157
duction market. These well-established tendencies are inconsistent with
widespread assertions of endemic “patent hold-up” and “royalty stacking”
that characterize the current international regulatory consensus.
Based on these theories, and without supporting empirical evidence, antitrust regulators in the U.S. (subject to an important recent shift in policy at
158
the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, as described below ) and other commercially
significant jurisdictions (including the European Union, China and South
159
Korea ) have taken a series of actions, starting in the mid-2000s, that have
substantially limited the enforcement and licensing capacities of SEP owners. As discussed below, some U.S. federal courts have issued rulings in patent and antitrust litigations that follow a similar policy trajectory and reflect, explicitly or implicitly, similar assumptions about the purportedly
adverse effects of patents in standard-dependent IT markets. Remarkably, a
theoretical conjecture with little supporting evidence has supported actions
that have incrementally subjected the worldwide smartphone market—a
market representing billions of dollars in annual worldwide revenues—to
what in certain respects resembles a generalized scheme of case-specific
rate-regulation through the vehicle of actual or threatened antitrust enforce-

in negotiations resulting in offsets to reflect each side’s patent portfolios. Barnett, Has the
Academy, supra note 12, at 1348-49.
155.
Dedrick & Kraemer, supra note 1, at 1 (finding that license fees paid to owners of
SEPs relating to smartphones constitute about 5% of the retail price); Alexander Galetovic, et
al., An Estimate of the Average Cumulative Royalty Yield in the World Mobile Phone Industry: Theory, Measurement and Results, 42 TELECOMM. POL’Y 263, 266 (2018) (finding that
the average estimated “cumulative royalty yield” for patent owners collectively in 2016 was
3.4% or $9.60 per device); Alexander Galetovic, et al., Is There an Anticommons Tragedy in
the World Smartphone Industry?, 32 BERKLEY TECH. L. J. 1527, 1527, 1532-33 (2017) (finding that, as of 2016, the average total patent royalty burden on a smartphone device represented 3.4% of the average selling price); Keith Mallinson, Cumulative Mobile-SEP Royalty Payments No More Than Around 5% of Mobile Handset Revenues, WiseHarbor (2015),
http://www.wiseharbor.com/pdfs/Mallinson%20on%20cumulative%20mobile%20SEP%20ro
yalties%20for%20IP%20Finance%202015Aug19.pdf (estimating aggregate royalty burden
paid by smartphone manufacturers to IP licensors to be approximately 5% of mobile handset
revenues); J. Gregory Sidak, What Aggregate Royalty Do Manufacturers of Mobile Phones
Pay to License Standard-Essential Patents?, 1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 701 (2016) (estimating aggregate royalty burden paid by smartphone manufacturers to IP licensors and
reaching upper bound of 4-5%).
156.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
157.
See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
158.
See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
159.
On actual and proposed interventions by antitrust authorities and courts in those
jurisdictions with respect to SEP and FRAND licensing, see Ginsburg et al., supra note 16, at
3.
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ment. These policy actions fall into two categories: (i) actions that seek to
limit SEP owners’ ability to secure injunctive relief against alleged infringers (and, in certain jurisdictions, expose SEP owners to antitrust liability for
seeking an injunction); and (ii) actions that seek to limit the “reasonable
royalty” that SEP owners can expect to recover in the case of a successful
160
infringement litigation or assess in licensing transactions. I will discuss
each of these forms of regulatory and judicial intervention.

1. The Disappearing Patent Injunction
161

In a 2006 decision, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, the Supreme
Court issued a decision that has substantially eroded the availability of injunctive relief in patent infringement litigation. Specifically, the Court upset
the long-standing presumption that injunctive relief follows once a patent
owner successfully defends the presumption of validity and shows that its
162
patent has been infringed. As interpreted by the lower courts, the eBay decision has effectively put in place an entity-dependent remedies regime in
which non-practicing entities are generally ineligible for injunctive relief
163
and are confined to seeking relief through monetary damages. In litigations involving alleged infringement of SEPs, both courts and agencies in
the U.S. and other jurisdictions have adopted the related view that the availability of injunctive relief should vary based on the type of patent held by a
particular entity. Specifically, courts and agencies have taken a series of actions that have largely eliminated the ability of SEP owners (whether practicing or non-practicing) to obtain injunctive relief, based on an expansive
and rigid view of the meaning of the “FRAND” requirement as discussed
164
above. In some jurisdictions, courts and agencies have taken the view that
even seeking injunctive relief can give rise to antitrust liability for a SEP
owner.

a. Judicial Actions
In 2012, Judge Richard Posner (acting as a district court judge by designation) issued a widely publicized decision denying injunctive relief for a

160.
The “reasonable royalty” standard is the principal measure of monetary damages
under U.S. patent law, which provides that patent damages will be an amount “adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use
made of the invention by the infringer.” 35 U.S.C. §284 (2012).
161.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
162.
See id. at 392-94.
163.
For an empirical study showing this clear pattern in remedies outcomes in patent
infringement litigation, see Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1952-53 (2016) (finding that
“while the vast majority of patentees still obtain injunctive relief following eBay, PAEs rarely
do”).
164.
See supra notes 120-30 and accompanying text.
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SEP holder (Motorola) and awarding attorneys’ fees to the infringer (Apple), on the grounds that seeking an injunction was generally inconsistent
165
with the FRAND commitment. In 2013, a district court in another patent
infringement litigation similarly determined that a SEP holder’s pursuit of
an injunction against an infringing party was inconsistent with its FRAND
166
commitment. Although the Federal Circuit later rejected any unqualified
“no injunctions for SEPs” rule, it did hold that a SEP holder could only seek
injunctive relief if the infringer were deemed unwilling to enter into a
167
FRAND-compliant license. The Federal Circuit stated further that, in cases in which a patent owner subject to FRAND had entered into licenses with
other parties, there is a strong suggestion that “money damages are adequate
168
to fully compensate” the patentee. Putting these principles into practice,
the court then upheld the denial of injunctive relief, despite at least some evidence that Apple had allegedly engaged in stalling tactics that may reason169
ably have placed it in the category of an “unwilling licensee.” Following a
similar line of reasoning, the Ninth Circuit, in a litigation between Microsoft
and Motorola (effectively, Google, having acquired Motorola Mobility in
170
2011 ) upheld both the denial of an injunction to the patent holder
(Motorola), adopting the principle that seeking injunctive relief is inconsistent with a FRAND commitment, and the award of attorneys’ fees against
171
the patent holder for seeking an injunction. In September 2018, an administrative judge at the International Trade Commission, a U.S. administrative
entity, declined to issue a “block importation” order sought by Qualcomm
against certain Apple iPhone and iPad devices, notwithstanding the fact that
the infringed patents were not SEPs (and therefore not subject to a FRAND
commitment) and the judge had determined that the Apple devices were in-

165.
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 2d 901, 913-15 (N.D. Ill. 2012), modified on other grounds, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
166.
Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F.Supp. 2d 998 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
The court’s decision was influenced by the fact that it found that the patent owner had not
made a qualifying license offer to the allegedly infringing party prior to seeking an injunction.
See id. at 1007 (“Defendants make no meaningful argument that they offered a RAND license
to Realtek prior to naming Realtek in the ITC action”).
167.
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
168.
Id. This finding is material because, under the multi-factor test for injunctive relief
as set forth in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, a patentee must show that monetary damages
do not provide adequate relief. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391
(2006) (“A plaintiff must demonstrate . . . that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury”).
169.
See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332-34, 1342-43 (Rader, J., dissenting in part) (Fed. Cir. 2014).
170.
See Evelyn M. Rusli & Claire Cain Miller, Google to Buy Motorola Mobility for
$12.5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011, 7:43 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/08/15/google-to-buy-motorola-mobility/.
171.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
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172

fringing upon those patents. This is only the fourth occasion in which the
ITC has denied injunctive relief for a patent owner who has successfully de173
fended the validity of its patent and shown infringement.

b. Antitrust Actions
During approximately the same period, U.S. antitrust regulators took
actions that either deter SEP holders from pursuing injunctive relief against
infringing users or facilitate efforts by SSOs to achieve the same objective.
In a 2007 policy statement, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division expressed concern
over patent holdup and took the view that SEP owners, by virtue of having
committed to license their patents on FRAND terms, had forfeited the right
174
to seek injunctive relief against infringers. In 2011, the FTC expressed a
175
similar view. In 2012, a DOJ antitrust regulator encouraged SSOs to adopt
policies that would address patent holdup by limiting SEP owners’ ability to
176
pursue injunctions and pre-specifying SEP royalty rates. In 2013, the FTC
filed a complaint against Google, alleging that Google and its newlyacquired subsidiary, Motorola Mobility, had pursued injunctive remedies
against allegedly infringing third parties in violation of Motorola’s FRAND

172.
Certain Mobile Electronic Devices and Radio Frequency and Processing Components Thereof, Notice of Comm. Determination Not to Review an Initial Determination Granting Complaint’s Unopposed Motion to Terminate the Investigation as to Certain Patent
Claims Based Upon Withdrawal of Allegations Pertaining to Those Claims from the Complaint, Inv. No. 337-TA-1065 (April 6, 2018). https://www.usitc.gov/secretary/
fed_reg_notices/337/337_1065_notice_04062018sgl.pdf [hereinafter Certain Mobile Electronic Devices].
173.
See Michael T. Renaud et al., ALJ Pender: Apple Infringes, but No Exclusion Order
for Qualcomm, MINTZ INSIGHTS, Oct. 4, 2018, https://www.mintz.com/insightscenter/viewpoints/2231/2018-10-alj-pender-apple-infringes-no-exclusion-order-qualcomm.
Note that the ITC is not subject to the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), which limits courts’ latitude to issue injunctions in patent infringement cases. See Spansion, Inc. et al. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Given the different statutory underpinnings for relief before the Commission in Section 337 actions and before the district courts in suits for patent infringement, this
court holds that eBay does not apply to Commission remedy determinations under Section
337”). Upon appeal in March 2019, the ITC commissioners ruled the underlying patent invalid, thereby rendering moot the refusal to issue the exclusion order. Asa Fitch & Tripp Mickle, Apple, Qualcomm Trade Blows in Patent Fight, WALL ST. J. (March 26, 2019, 9:44 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-violated-qualcomm-patent-u-s-trade-judge-rules11553624866. For further details, see infra notes 229-17 and accompanying text.
174.
See FTC/DOJ REPORT 2007, supra note 15, at 8 n.11, 35 n.42.
175.
See FTC REPORT 2011, supra note 15, at 235 (stating that “[a] prior FRAND commitment can provide strong evidence that denial of the injunction and ongoing royalties will
not irreparably harm the patentee”).
176.
See Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as
Prepared for the ITU-T Patent Roundtable: Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch 6, 9
(Oct. 10, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518951/download. For discussion of this
speech and other similar statements during this period by DOJ antitrust regulators, see Sidak,
Devaluation, supra note 130, at 49-50.
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177

commitment. In 2013, a joint report issued by the DOJ and the USPTO
expressed the view that issuing an injunction in the case of a SEP infringe178
ment litigation “may be inconsistent with the public interest.”
In 2013, the FTC conditioned approval of Google’s acquisition of
Motorola Mobility (a new entity formed in connection with the split of
179
Motorola into two entities in 2011 ) upon Google’s agreement not to seek
injunctions in connection with SEPs to be acquired in the acquisition (unless
180
a potential licensee refuses a “FRAND-compliant” licensing offer). In
2015, as noted previously, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division granted a favorable
business review letter to IEEE, a leading SSO that had proposed to preclude
contributing patent owners from seeking injunctive relief, except in limited
181
circumstances. Given these developments, it seems fair to say that a SEP
owner has little expectation that it can secure injunctive relief in U.S. courts.
Outside the U.S., European, Chinese and Korean competition agencies have
moved one step further in this policy direction and taken actions or issued
statements suggesting that even seeking injunctive relief against an infringer
182
could expose a SEP owner to antitrust liability.

2. Reasonable Royalties: Regulatory v. Market Wisdom
Any economically plausible defense of a no-injunction policy toward
SEPs necessarily relies on the assumption that SEP owners will be adequately compensated through monetary damages awarded by a court in infringement litigation, taking into account the costs and risks borne by an innovator-firm in developing technology for possible inclusion in a standard.
There are two factors that challenge this assumption in the current legal environment. First, even a patentee who is awarded economically commensurate damages is still not “made whole” since, absent a showing of willful
infringement or other exceptional circumstances, it cannot typically recover

177.
See J. Gregory Sidak, Injunctive Relief and the FRAND Commitment in the United
States, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW:
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 389, 403 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018) [hereinafter
Sidak, Injunctive Relief]. For the original complaint, see In the Matter of Motorola Mobility
and Google Inc., Docket No. C-4410, July 23, 2013.
178.
See DOJ/USPTO REPORT 2013, supra note 15, at 6. To be clear, the report does
recognize that injunctive relief may be appropriate if an infringing firm declines a FRANDcompliant offer from the patent holder. See id.
179.
Associated Press, Motorola to Officially Split into Two Firms Tuesday, CNBC (Jan.
3, 2011, 6:38 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/40897532.
180.
Motorola Mobility LLC, Docket No. C-4410 (July 23, 2013), at ¶¶ II.B, II.C,
II.D, IV,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724google
motorolado.pdf.
181.
Renata B. Hesse, supra note 127.
182.
For discussion, see Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The Elusive Role of Competition in the
Standard-Setting Antitrust Debate, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 118-19 (2017).
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183

compensation for the legal fees incurred as part of the litigation process.
Second, antitrust regulators have advocated that courts should determine
reasonable royalty damages in SEP infringement litigation based on the
“smallest salable patent-practicing unit” (“SSPPU”), as distinguished from
184
the larger device of which the component is a part. By extension, regulators have argued further that SEP owners should assess royalties in licensing
185
transactions at the level of the SSPPU , which runs counter to longestablished practices in the smartphone market of portfolio licensing at the
186
device level. This regulatory effort to remake SEP licensing practices in
the smartphone market—dramatically illustrated by the district court’s order
187
in the FTC v. Qualcomm litigation —ultimately rests on the view that allocating to the innovator any portion of the value generated by the standardization process implies a form of patent holdup that confers a windfall on the
188
patent owner. To the extent that courts regularly implement this principle
for purposes of determining reasonable royalty damages and SSOs widely
adopt this principle for licensing purposes, SEP owners would have reduced
confidence that R&D investments can be reliably monetized through the patent licensing infrastructure that has supported four successive generations
of wireless communications technologies.

a. Regulatory Override
Under the Patent Act, a patentee that has defended the presumption of
validity and shown infringement is entitled to “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty
189
for the use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .” Following the
190
framework set forth in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.,
courts generally determine the reasonable royalty by simulating a hypothet183.
For details on the extensive transaction costs associated with FRAND-related litigation, see Epstein & Kappos, supra note 135, at 80-82. On the infrequency with which willful
infringement is found in SEP infringement litigation, see infra note 211.
184.
See infra notes 198-210 and accompanying discussion.
185.
For an example of a regulator expressing this view, see HESSE, supra note 176; for
further discussion of these views, see infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
186.
On the market preference for device-level licensing, see infra notes 196 and 214-17
and accompanying text.
187.
FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., N.D. Cal., Case No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, May 21, 2019
(Koh, J.), at 227-229 (requiring that Qualcomm renegotiate existing SEP licenses).
188.
See e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, A Simple Approach, supra note 149, at 1148 (“By construction, the reasonable royalty does not include the value attaching to the creation and adoption of the standard itself.”). For a critique of this assumption, see Edward F. Sherry et al.,
FRAND Commitments in Theory and Practice: A Response to Lemley and Shapiro’s “A Simple Approach” (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Ctr. for the Mgmt. of Intellectual Capital, Working
Paper No. 3, 2015).
189.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
190.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), modified and aff’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
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ical negotiation between a willing licensor and licensee of the relevant patent. Although there is a rich and complex body of case law on the appropri191
ate methodologies for putting this principle into practice , any such exercise ultimately reduces to a determination of the appropriate royalty base
and the appropriate rate to generate the damages award. While GeorgiaPacific identifies multiple factors that may be relevant in a reasonable royalty analysis, the Federal Circuit has emphasized the special importance of
evidence concerning the royalty rates in economically comparable licensing
192
transactions. This makes perfect sense: market prices reflect a much richer
pool of transactions than a court could reasonably expect to discover
through competing expert witness testimonies in a single litigation. In the
SEP context, the Georgia-Pacific framework would imply that courts
should pay special attention to the fact that prevailing market practice in the
smartphone and other related IT industries has used the end-user price of the
193
relevant device as the base to which the royalty rate is applied. Yet some
academics, regulators and litigants have urged courts to ignore market practice in SEP infringement litigation. Based on the assumption that patent
holdup and royalty stacking widely afflict patent-intensive IT markets, Mark
Lemley and Carl Shapiro argued in 2007 (both separately and in coauthored papers) that courts should avoid overcompensating SEP owners by
determining the reasonable royalty by reference to the incremental value of
194
the patented component, rather than the entire value of the product.
In 2009, Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit (but sitting as a district
court judge by designation) held, in the context of damages proceedings involving infringement of a patent relating to a component of a computing
system, that the reasonable royalty should be calculated using the SSPPU as
195
the royalty base. It is important to note that he made this holding in the
context of an evidentiary ruling and specifically for the purpose of limiting

191.
For a review, see THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 119-139 (2006).
192.
See Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1267-68 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (stating that, if there is evidence of an “established” royalty rate, that evidence should
be the principal basis for determining reasonable royalty damages, as compared with other
evidence that may be less certain).
193.
See J. Gregory Sidak, The Proper Royalty Base for Patent Damages, 10 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 989, 993, 996 (2014) [hereinafter Sidak, Proper Royalty Base]
(providing examples from royalty practices of Nokia, ZTE, Nortel and IBM); Sherry et al.,
supra note 182, at 3-4 n.14 (noting that market practice favors calculating royalty based on the
device’s wholesale selling price).
194.
See Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Patent Reward and Contribution, in 8
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (2007). In a co-authored paper, Shapiro and Mark
Lemley argue that the royalty should be calculated based on the incremental value of the patented component, discounted by the probability that the patent would be deemed valid by a
court – meaning, the patent owner would recover an amount that is even less than the incremental value measure. See Lemley & Shapiro, A Simple Approach, supra note 149, at 1148.
195.
Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F.Supp. 279, 287-88 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
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the possibility that a jury would be misled by a broader royalty base above
196
As the Federal Circuit has subsequently exthe level of the SSPPU.
plained, this reflects prudential concerns that a jury’s “damages horizon”
would be skewed by using a broader royalty base, even if instructed to adjust the royalty rate to reflect the patented component’s relative contribu197
Despite this limited application as a precautionary step to mitigate
tion.
jury confusion, Judge Rader’s ruling has nonetheless been interpreted by
some commentators, regulators and courts as having set forth a substantive
requirement that courts in SEP infringement litigation must always calculate
the reasonable royalty, and, by logical extension, SEPs must always be li198
censed, on the basis of the SSPPU. In 2015, the IEEE, a leading SSO in
the IT market, implemented this approach and amended its IPR licensing
policy (after receiving effective pre-clearance through a DOJ Antitrust busi199
ness review letter ) to provide that determination of FRAND-compliant
“reasonable” royalties “should include . . . the consideration of [t]he value
that the functionality of the claimed invention . . . contributes to the value of
the relevant functionality of the smallest saleable Compliant Implementation
200
that practices the Essential Patent Claim.”

b. Judicial Restraint
While regulators have largely succeeded in entrenching a lightly qualified no-injunction principle in SEP infringement jurisprudence, they have
had mixed success in securing judicial adoption of the SSPPU approach as a
mandatory rule that uniformly governs reasonable royalty determinations in
SEP infringement litigation and licensing transactions. As of 2018, David
Kappos and Paul Michel showed that, while courts had addressed the
SSPPU concept in over 75 district court cases, they had done so in almost
all cases for purposes of avoiding the perceived risk of patentee overcom-

196.
See id., at 283 (stating that the trial court had properly excluded testimony from an
expert witness who had used the “CPU” module as the royalty base because doing so would
“mislead the jury to award damages far in excess of their compensatory purpose”).
197.
See LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67-68 (Fed. Cir.
2012), citing Uniloc USA Inc. et al. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
198.
For a description of these views, see David Kappos & Paul Michel, The Smallest
Saleable Patent-Practicing Unit: Observations on its Origins Development and Future, 32
BERKLEY TECH. L. J. 1433, 1446-47 (2018). For an example of a regulator advocating that
SSOs should adopt the “SSPPU” as a mandatory rule for licensing standard-essential patents,
see HESSE, supra note 173. For an example of a court deeming the SSPPU to be a mandatory
principle in SEP licensing transactions, see FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., N.D. Cal., Case No. 17CV-00220-LHK, May 21, 2019 (Koh, J.), at 172-73 (holding that device-level licensing is
inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the SSPPU requirement).
199.
Renata B. Hesse, supra note 124.
200.
IEEE Bylaws, supra note 128, at 15-16.
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201

pensation by a jury unfamiliar with patent licensing. In a recent SEP infringement litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, a jury even rejected
the SSPPU approach on the grounds that it did not track market practices as
202
reflected in comparable licenses. In short: there is considerable evidence
that courts are continuing to hew closely to the emphasis that patent case
law generally places on comparable licenses and other indicia of market
practice as the primary source of evidence for purposes of determining rea203
sonable royalty damages.
It is helpful to appreciate why courts might generally prefer relying on
market wisdom over regulatory wisdom in infringement litigation involving
SEPs and multi-component technology more generally. SEP licensing transactions take place in a market environment that is typically populated by sophisticated parties on both side of the negotiating table. If that is the case,
then the choice of royalty base should not matter. The reason is simple: any
given royalty amount can be replicated at the component or device level
simply by adjusting the percentage rate appropriately to reflect the size of
204
the base. It is precisely the mathematical equivalence of device-level and
component-level royalty-setting that explains the limited “pedagogical”
purpose for which Judge Rader initially adopted in the context of a jury trial
the progenitor of what some commentators and policymakers have since
transformed into the “SSPPU rule” that would apply across-the-board in all
SEP infringement litigations and licensing transactions. To correct any such
substantive misinterpretation, the Federal Circuit, in 2014 and 2015, specifically rejected the proposition that damages calculations in infringement litigations involving multi-component products must always use the SSPPU
approach, clarifying that this is an “evidentiary principle” designed to avoid

201.
For a detailed account, see Kappos & Michel, supra note 198, at 1444-45. As Kappos and Michel note, the court in one case did apply the SSPPU principle outside the jury context to identify the royalty base for purposes of determining damages. See In re Innovatio IP
Ventures, LLC, 2013 WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 3, 2013) (applying SSPPU in a bench trial
to identify the royalty base to determine damages and not to avoid jury confusion).
202.
HTC Corp et al. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson et al., Civil Action No. 6:18CV-00243-JRG (E.D. Tex., May 23, 2019). The court stated: “Ericsson [the patentee] established, and HTC’s [the infringer’s] own experts conceded, that there are no examples in the
industry of licenses that have been negotiated based on the profit margin, or even the cost, of a
baseband processor [the SSPPU proposed by HTC for damages purposes]. HTC’s license
expert . . . was unable to identify a single industry license based on the profit margin of a
chip”, see id., at 10.
203.
See supra note 193.
204.
To illustrate: a 10% royalty on a component-level royalty base of $100 is equivalent to a 1% royalty on a device-level royalty base of $1000. The Federal Circuit has made the
same observation, noting that “an appropriate apportioned royalty award could . . . be fashioned by starting with the entire market value of a multi-component product—by, for instance,
dramatically reducing the royalty rate to be applied in those cases . . . .” See Ericsson, Inc. v.
D-Link Syss., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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205

jury confusion. This limited function of the SSPPU as a preemptive errormitigation tool in the litigation context in turn casts doubt on assertions that
the SSPPU “requirement” applies more broadly to SEP licensing transac206
tions in the marketplace. The assumed lack of sophistication among jury
members that drove adoption of the SSPPU approach in the litigation context is implausible in the case of business parties that regularly engage in IP
licensing transactions.

c. Market Backlash
If sophisticated licensors and licensees have converged over the course
of the wireless markets on device-level royalty rates as an efficient market
norm, then it would be expected that regulatory efforts to move the market
away from that norm would meet with resistance. This is exactly what has
happened. The IEEE’s aforementioned 2015 amendment, which effectively
mandated component-level SEP licensing, rapidly produced an observable
adverse effect on the SSO process. Following adoption of the amendment
by the IEEE and through 2017, most researchers have observed a significant
to dramatic decline in the number of new technical contributions to the
IEEE 802.11 (“WiFi”) working groups that were accompanied by positive
letters of assurance (“LOAs”) (that is, indicating a commitment to FRAND
licensing principles) and a dramatic increase in the number of new technical
contributions accompanied by negative LOAs (that is, disclaiming any
207
The drop-off in the subcommitment to FRAND licensing principles).
205.
Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Syss., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295,
1303-04 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (upholding the trial court’s calculation of a reasonable royalty based
on a royalty base consisting of end-product sales); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Syss., Inc., 773
F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating that the SSPPU is an “evidentiary principle . . . assisting in reliably implementing the [apportionment] rule when—in a case involving a per-unit
royalty—the jury is asked to choose a royalty base as the starting point for calculating a reasonable royalty award”).
206.
This type of assertion is found in FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., N.D. Cal., Case No. 17CV-00220-LHK, May 21, 2019 (Koh, J.), at 172-73 (holding that device-level licensing is
“inconsistent with . . . Federal Circuit case law on the smallest salable patent practicing unit”).
This statement suffers from two flaws. First, it ignores the fact that the Federal Circuit has
specifically rejected use of the SSPPU as a mandatory rule for determining damages in all
cases involving multi-component technologies, see Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research
Org. v. Cisco Syss., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The rule Cisco advances—
which would require all damages models to begin with the smallest salable patent-practicing
unit—is untenable”). Second, it implausibly derives the proposition that privately negotiated
licensing transactions are subject to the SSPPU approach from Federal Circuit case law requiring use of the SSPPU approach for the limited purpose of avoiding jury error in determining reasonable royalty damages.
207.
See Kirti Gupta & Georgios Effraimidis, IEEE Patent Policy Revisions: An Empirical Examination of Impact (March 2018), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/researchfaculty/searlecenter/events/roundtable/documents/effraimidis_gupta.pdf (providing data on
letters of assurance filed for IEEE 802.11 standard during 2005-2017); KEITH MALLINSON,
DEVELOPMENT OF INNOVATIVE NEW STANDARDS JEOPARDIZED BY IEEE PATENT POLICY,
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mission of positive LOAs is especially large among firms that have histori208
cally been among the leading submitters of positive LOAs to the IEEE.
Prior to this period, only one negative LOA had ever accompanied a new
209
technical submission.
The Figure below shows this striking response of innovator-firms to
IEEE’s attempt starting in 2015 to entrench the SSPPU rule as part of the
mandatory content of FRAND licensing principles.

4IP COUNCIL, Sept. 7, 2017, https://www.4ipcouncil.com/application/files/6015/0479/2147/
Mallinson_IEEE_LOA_report.pdf (studying letters of assurance filed for IEEE 802.11 standard for 18-month period ending June 2017); Ron Katznelson, The IEEE Controversial Policy
on Standard Essential Patents – The Empirical Record Since Adoption, Oct. 29, 2016 (updated March 2018), https://works.bepress.com/rkatznelson/80/. Note that these researchers distinguish between new and “duplicate” or “repeat” submissions; the trends described in the text
above relate solely to new (also known as “non-duplicate” or “unique”) submissions. This
distinction appears to account in part for the contrary results reached by TIM POHLMANN,
EMPIRICAL STUDY ON PATENTING AND STANDARDIZATION ACTIVITIES AT IEEE, (Mar. 2017),
https://www.iplytics.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/IPlytics_2017_Patenting-andstandardization-activities-at-IEEE.pdf. Pohlmann presents data showing that submission of
positive letters of assurance to IEEE following adoption of the IEEE policy change persisted
in 2015 and 2016 consistently with historical averages, but (unlike the researchers mentioned
above) counts “duplicate” letters of assurance filed in connection with an amendment of a
standard. See id. at 10-11. Mallinson argues that some firms have strategic motivations to file
duplicate positive letters of assurance in response to merely clarifying policy amendments
and, therefore, counting duplicates can distort the use of filing data for purposes of assessing
the “health” of the standardization process. See Mallinson, supra note 197, at 11-12. Note
that, even if duplicate positive letters of assurance were included, this would not alter the finding that firms only started filing negative letters of assurance for the IEEE 802.11 standard
following adoption of the IEEE policy change (except for a single such filing in 2010). See
Gupta & Effraimidis, supra note 197, at 15.
208.
See Mallinson, supra note 197, at 13-14.
209.
See Gupta & Effraimidis, supra note 197, at 15.
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Figure 3: Letters of Assurance to 802.11 IEEE Standard
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It is possible that the market’s resistance to the IEEE’s re-interpretation
of the FRAND commitment represents a self-interested effort by patent
owners to preserve a licensing arrangement by which they had earned royalties in excess of the levels required to support R&D investment incentives.
Yet, given the market’s long-standing preference for device-level royalty
licensing, coupled with the ability of reasonably sophisticated entities to
replicate agreed-upon divisions of value irrespective of the selected royalty
base, it is worth considering whether this practice represents an efficient
contracting device that has evolved through the trial-and-error process of
market experience. If that is the case, then efforts to substitute the SSPPU
standard for existing market practices may be a misguided undertaking that
endangers efficient arrangements for licensing intellectual assets, and implementing agreed-upon divisions of market value, among the diverse pool
of innovators, producers, and distributors that each play important functions
in the smartphone ecosystem.
There are at least three transaction-cost considerations that can plausibly explain why licensors and licensees would collectively benefit from licensing at the device rather than the component level. First, the smartphone
market may calculate the license fee payable by device makers as a percentage of the sale price for the simple reason that this is an observable figure
that is not amenable to manipulation or dispute by licensees or licensors.
Second, the retail device market, being more liquid than upstream and mid-

210.

See id. at 22.

220

Michigan Technology Law Review

[Vol. 25:163

stream component markets, may offer the best measure of the IP licensor’s
211
contribution to the total product-and-services bundle. Relatedly, as Alex
Galetovic and Stephen Haber have argued, pricing a component at the device level provides the most accurate indication of economic value since it
captures the value that consumers place on that component in interaction
212
with other components of the same product package. Third, situating IP
licensing at the device level imposes considerably fewer transaction costs
than engaging in multiple licensing transactions at discrete component lev213
els in the IT supply chain. This would require a laborious effort to identify
the “SSPPU” with respect to each component of a multi-component product
214
package.
In the aggregate, these considerations suggest that the growing academic and regulatory consensus in favor of mandatory component-level licensing, which necessarily presumes that device-level licensing represents patentee overreaching, may have things backward. Rather than assuming
without empirical inquiry that a well-established market practice reflects
market failure (especially in an environment populated by well-resourced
and sophisticated licensors and licensees), it may be more prudent for commentators and policymakers to start from the rebuttable presumption that
any such practice reflects an efficient response to the technological and economic conditions of the smartphone and related IT markets.

B. From Patent Holdup to Patent Holdout
To the extent that antitrust agencies, courts and SSOs in commercially
significant jurisdictions have adopted a no-injunction principle (or mildly
qualified variants thereof), it is reasonable to assert that the worldwide
smartphone and related SEP-intensive device markets now operate under a
de facto regime of compulsory licensing in which SEP owners are restricted
to securing monetary damages from infringing third parties. This reduction
in patent strength is at risk of being compounded further by regulatory efforts to embed the SSPPU principle as a substantive rule for determining
royalties in SEP infringement litigation and SSO licensing policies. This
would effectively override and impose a judicial ceiling on existing marketnegotiated royalty rates. The logic behind this infringer-friendly regime is
straightforward. In the absence of injunctive relief, a SEP holder can no
longer credibly threaten an infringer with shutdown and, as a result, cannot
211.
See Bowman Heiden & Jens Andreasson, Reevaluating Patent Damages in the
Knowledge Economy: The Intellectual Value Chain and the Royalty Base for StandardEssential Patents, 1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 229, 261-62 (2016).
212.
See Alexander Galetovic & Stephen H. Haber, SEP Royalties: What Theory of Value and Distribution Should Courts Apply?, 4 (Hoover IP2, Working Paper No. 19001, 2019).
For related discussion, see Sidak, Proper Royalty Base, supra note 187, at 993-94.
213.
See Kappos & Michel, supra note 190, at 1446-47.
214.
See id.
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extract “excessive” royalties or other payments from entities that have made
irrevocable investments in the patented technology and have no costfeasible non-infringing alternative.
This “patent-lite” regime rests on a straightforward argument. So long
as monetary damages as determined in court provide upstream IP holders
with a sufficient return on their R&D investment (net of litigation and related costs), this regime would appear to preserve R&D incentives while protecting downstream implementers against opportunistic hold-up. While
plausible in theory, this argument has two critical failings. First, it heroically
assumes that courts typically have adequate information to calculate the “efficient” patent royalty such that innovators are perfectly compensated for
the costs and risks they have uniquely borne in R&D and related productdevelopment activities. As discussed above, at least some courts and agencies have pursued damages calculation methodologies that are likely to generate sums that undercompensate innovators for the costs and risks undertaken in connection with the relevant standard-setting process. Second, it
does not address the fact that an injunction-free regime necessarily induces
opportunistic “hold-out” by downstream users, especially in circumstances
in which (i) litigation is costly, lengthy and uncertain, (ii) the downstream
user has ample litigation resources at its disposal, (iii) the patented technology exhibits some positive rate of commercial or technological obsolescence, (iv) monetary damages tend to be undercompensatory (whether due
to judicial methodology or collection difficulties), and (v) there is a sufficiently limited possibility that a court will find willful infringement and
215
award supercompensatory damages. Without a credible injunction threat
215.
It appears that a willfulness finding and enhanced damages (which a court has discretion to award following a willfulness finding) are an unlikely possibility in a SEP infringement litigation. See Contreras et al., supra note 181, at 293-95 (noting that only one
district court has awarded supercompensatory damages to a SEP holder and describing the
view that such damages are inappropriate in the case of a SEP holder because of the high percentage of SEPs that are likely not essential). More generally, empirical evidence indicates
that a willfulness finding is not a typical outcome in patent infringement litigation. For all patent cases filed between September 2004 and July 2010, 1.9% reached a final decision on willfulness, of which 48% reached a positive finding prior to August 2007 (when the Federal Circuit adopted a more stringent standard for finding willfulness) and 37% reached a positive
finding after that date. Among cases that resulted in a willfulness finding, the mean enhanced
damages multiplier applied by the court was 213% during Sept 2004-August 2007 and 198%
thereafter through July 2010. See Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and
Enhanced Damages After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 441 (evidence on willful infringement) and 469-70 (evidence on enhanced damages) (2012). As is the
case in civil litigation more generally, only a small percentage of filed patent cases are ever
finally adjudicated, with estimates in the range of 3-5%, see id., at 436-37. A more recent
study finds that, out of a sample of 88 cases in which plaintiffs filed a motion for willful infringement, the court found willful infringement 36% of the time prior to the Court’s decision
in Halo Elecs, Inc. v. Pulse Elecs, Inc. 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (which relaxed the standard for
finding willful infringement) and 54% of the time thereafter, although the average damages
multiplier decreased from 2.5x to 2.1x. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2018 PATENT
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and limited assurance that a substantial damages award (net of legal fees)
are a likely prospect, an upstream innovator may be deterred from pursuing
an infringement action and will rationally settle for a reduced royalty payment from the implementer firm. While this outcome would reduce implementers’ technology input costs and, depending on competitive conditions,
potentially result in static efficiency gains in the form of lower prices for
end-users, the absence of a credible shutdown threat (compounded by reduced expected damages) may depress licensing fees below the dynamically
efficient levels required to remunerate innovators for the costs and risks inherent to R&D activities. In response, those firms would respond by reducing the allocation of funds to R&D, vertically integrating forward into production and distribution, or seeking to monetize R&D outside the
cooperative standard-setting process and the associated FRAND licensing
framework. Even assuming R&D and follow-on standardization activities
could still be successfully achieved at a comparable scale, cost and level of
functionality, the result may be a mix of organizational structures that is less
efficient in the aggregate relative to the mix of structures that would prevail
under a more secure IP regime.
To be clear, courts and regulators have paid some attention to the holdout risk that would necessarily arise in the case of a flat prohibition on injunctions for SEP holders. In the Apple v. Motorola case, Judge Posner (acting as the district court judge) had qualified the denial of injunctive relief,
stating that a SEP holder could not seek an injunction against a third party
216
that had demonstrated a “willingness” to license on FRAND terms. In reviewing Posner’s decision, the Federal Circuit made a similar “willing licensee” precondition for the denial of injunctive relief to SEP holders sub217
ject to the FRAND commitment. In a 2015 decision in the European
Union, Huawei v. ZTE, the European Court of Justice held that a SEP holder
could pursue an injunction against an alleged infringer without antitrust liability for “abuse of dominance”, so long as the patentee provides sufficient
notice and the alleged infringer rejects, or fails to “ diligently respond” to, a
218
licensing offer deemed to be FRAND-compliant. Similarly, in 2017, the
United Kingdom’s High Court of Justice (Patents) held that an injunction
may be available to a SEP holder if the infringing user “refuses to take a li219
cense on terms found by the court to be FRAND.” In another deviation
from dominant tendencies, a Chinese court in December 2018 granted lim-

LITIGATION STUDY 17 (2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
2018-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf.
216.
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 2d 901, 913-14 (N.D. Ill. 2012), modified on other grounds, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
217.
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1331-32 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
218.
Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. Co. v. ZTE Deutschland GmbH 2014 E.C.R. 477 ¶¶
61-67.
219.
Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711.

Spring 2019]

Antitrust Overreach

223

ited preliminary injunctive relief to Qualcomm in its patent infringement litigation against Apple, barring the import of certain Apple phones and other
220
devices.
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has recently taken
even more substantial steps in this direction. In a November 2017 speech,
the head of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, Makan Delrahim, stated that patent hold-out by implementer firms represents a more substantial risk than
holdup by innovator firms (due to the fact, as discussed earlier, that the innovator must incur R&D expenditures well before the standard is set and
adopted), and rejected any no-injunction policy with respect to SEPs, specifically criticizing the Federal Circuit’s qualified support for such a rule in the
221
Apple v. Motorola litigation. On December 7, 2018, Delrahim announced
that the DOJ would withdraw from the joint policy statement that had been
co-released in 2003 by the DOJ and the PTO and had suggested that SEP
owners should not be entitled to an injunction given the risk of patent
222
holdup.
Yet it is important not to overstate the practical importance of these
qualifications to the quasi-prohibition on injunctions for SEP owners. Even
the dramatic shift in policy indicated by DOJ Antitrust has not yet been reflected in decisions by the federal courts or adopted by any other competi223
tion law agency. Second, even under the more patentee-friendly framework adopted by the European and UK courts, the SEP owner will always
be uncertain whether a particular licensing offer to an infringer will subse-

220.
See China: iPhone Import and Sale Ban Over Qualcomm Dispute, COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L (Dec. 10, 2018) https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/china-iphoneimport-and-sale-ban-over-qualcomm-dispute/.
221.
Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the USC
Gould School of Law’s Center for Transnational Law and Business Conference (Nov. 10,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahimdelivers-remarks-usc-gould-school-laws-center. In speeches delivered in March and September 2018, Delrahim reiterated those views. See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for IAM’s Patent Licensing Conference: Antitrust Law
and
Patent
Licensing
in
the
New
Wild
West
(Sept.
18,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1095011/download; Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at University of Pennsylvania
Law School: The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law (Mar.
16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1044316/download.
222.
Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the 19th
Annual Berkeley-Stanford Advanced Patent Law Institute: “Telegraph Road”: Incentivizing
Innovation at the Intersection of Patent and Antitrust Law (Dec. 7, 2018).
223.
There are some limited qualifications to this general tendency. A recent statement
by the European competition authority acknowledges the risk of “patent holdout” under a noinjunction regime. See Eur. Comm., Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee 9-10 (Nov. 29,
2017). Recent guidelines released by the Japan Patent Office acknowledge the risk of both
patent holdup and patent holdout in connection with the enforcement of SEPs. See Japan Pat.
Off., Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents 1 (June 5, 2018).
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quently be deemed as FRAND-compliant. As a general matter, it remains
the case that upstream innovator-firms continue to operate in commercially
significant markets under a truncated IP regime in which injunctive relief is
largely foreclosed and the availability of monetary damages is subject to
substantial uncertainty. As a result, an R&D-specialist firm has considerably
reduced confidence that it can capture adequate returns on its R&D investments through negotiated licensing transactions. Any innovator that enters
into a licensing agreement with an implementer-firm (especially, a wellresourced firm that can fund an extended litigation) must take into account
some positive likelihood that the counterparty will unilaterally cease making
payments, and then either the counterparty will challenge the agreement on
antitrust grounds or the relevant antitrust authority will do so.
In the extended sequence of litigations in U.S. courts involving Qualcomm, the FTC and Apple, both possibilities have been realized. On January 17, 2017, the FTC filed an antitrust lawsuit against Qualcomm concern225
ing its licensing practices, which was followed three days later by a suit
by Apple against Qualcomm (Apple’s primary chip supplier for the iPhone)
226
on antitrust and breach of contract grounds. In April 2017, Apple ceased
to reimburse its contract manufacturers for royalty payments to Qualcomm,
which unsurprisingly led the contract manufacturers to cease making those
227
payments. While those billions of dollars in licensing fees remained outstanding, Qualcomm and Apple engaged in dueling patent infringement
228
suits and countersuits. In September 2018, an administrative judge at the
International Trade Commission rejected Qualcomm’s demand for a limited

224.
Similarly, Anne Layne-Farrar notes that, in practice, “establishing that a firm is an
‘unwilling licensee’ is an extremely difficult hurdle for SEP holders to clear”, see Anne
Layne-Farrar, Moving Past the SEP RAND Obsession: Some Thoughts on the Economic Implications of Unilateral Commitments and the Complexities of Patent Licensing, 21 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1093, 1105 n. 38 (2014). Illustrating this predicament, a Korean court granted
injunctive relief to a patent holder (Samsung) based on the finding that a defendant (Apple)
was an “unwilling licensee”, see Contreras et al., supra note 181, at 331-33 (discussing Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Korea Ltd. (Seoul S. Cent. D.C. 2012)), while, in apparently related
litigation, a Japanese court found that Apple was a “willing licensee” and declined to grant
Samsung injunctive relief. Id. at 333-36 (discussing Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Japan LLC
(Japan IP High Court 2014)).
225.
Fed. Trade Comm.’s Complaint for Equitable Relief, FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., Case
No. 5:17-cv-00220 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 17, 2017).
226.
See Shara Tibken, Apple sues Qualcomm over unfair licensing terms, CNET (Jan.
20, 2017); Redacted First Amended Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief, Apple, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., Case No. 17-cv-0108-GPC-MDD (S.D. Cal., filed
June 20, 2017).
227.
See Aaron Pressman, Apple Stops Paying iPhone Royalties, Escalating Feud with
Qualcomm, FORTUNE (Apr. 28, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/28/apple-iphone-royaltiesqualcomm/.
228.
See Stephen Nellis, Apple accuses Qualcomm of patent infringement in countersuit,
REUTERS, Nov. 29, 2017 (describing patent infringement suit filed by Qualcomm against Apple in July 2017 and patent infringement counterclaim filed by Apple in November 2017).
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exclusion order that would have banned certain Apple phones and other devices, even though those devices had been deemed to be infringing upon
229
Qualcomm’s patents. On April 16, 2019, these overlapping disputes (other
than the ITC proceeding and the FTC suit) abruptly ended when Apple and
230
Qualcomm announced a global settlement of all pending patent litigation
(which reportedly includes a payment of approximately $4.5 billion by Ap231
ple to Qualcomm ). However, the effect of the settlement on the legal
landscape in the wireless market was soon placed in considerable doubt. On
May 21, 2019, a federal district court ruled in the FTC’s favor in its antitrust
suit against Qualcomm and issued an especially broad remedy requiring
Qualcomm to renegotiate its existing SEP licenses (subject to judicial or arbitral resolution) and offer new SEP licenses to any interested chipmak232
ers. As of this writing, Qualcomm has announced that it plans to appeal
233
the decision to the Ninth Circuit.
The deteriorating legal environment for patent owners in the wireless
industry is nicely illustrated by Apple’s decision to withhold several billions
of dollars in licensing payments during its more than two years of litigation
against Qualcomm. This “don’t pay, litigate and maybe pay less (or nothing) later” strategy is perfectly rational from the perspective of a wellresourced licensee that operates in a legal environment in which even firms
with strong patent portfolios cannot make a credible threat to secure injunctive relief against an infringing party. As of October 2018, Qualcomm
claimed that Apple owed it approximately $7 billion in unpaid license
234
fees. Absent long-term reputation effects, it would be economically irrational for Apple to make that outstanding payment (or even some lesser
agreed-upon amount) without first attempting to potentially reduce the licensing fees to zero through patent and antitrust litigation. Given a suffi235
ciently limited risk of a willfulness finding (which could trigger super-

229.
See supra notes 173-173 and accompanying text. In March 2019, the ITC commissioners rendered the judge’s decision moot by finding Qualcomm’s underlying patent invalid.
Concurrently, in another ITC proceeding, an administrative judge issued a limited exclusion
order concerning certain Apple iPhone models found to infringe another Qualcomm patent.
The exclusion order is still subject to review by the ITC commissioners. See Elise Reuter,
ITC Rejects Qualcomm Patent in Final Decision, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., Mar. 26, 2019.
230.
See Tripp Micklie and Asa Fitch, Apple, Qualcomm Agree to Drop All Patent Litigation, Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 2019.
231.
See Asa Fitch, Qualcomm to Get at Least $4.5 Billion in Apple Settlement, Wall St.
J., May 1, 2019.
232.
FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., N.D. Cal., Case No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, May 21, 2019
(Koh, J.), at 227-32.
233.
See Nellis, supra note 5.
234.
See Jean Baptiste Su, Qualcomm Claims $7 Billion from Apple for Unpaid Royalty
Fees,
FORBES
(Oct.
28,
2018,
2:26
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/2018/10/28/qualcomm-claims-7-billion-fromapple-for-unpaid-royalty-fees/#60b7c39a6cb7.
235.
See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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compensatory damages) and continuing to assume little prospect of being
236
subject to economically meaningful injunctive relief , the infringer’s
worst-case scenario would result in payment of a sum equal to (i) a hypothetical royalty on past sales (plus interest), plus (ii) a continuing royalty on
future sales, plus (iii) legal fees. Aside from legal fees (effectively an option
paid to reveal information concerning the validity of the licensor’s patent),
this puts the infringing party in approximately the same position it would
have been in if it had not contested the license and underlying patents. In
practice, this so-called “efficient infringement” strategy is likely to result in
a renegotiated royalty rate being agreed upon in a settlement between the
licensor and licensee in advance of trial, discounted to reflect the likelihood
of an invalidity or non-infringement ruling. While this downward adjustment in patent royalty rates merely constitutes a wealth transfer among different parties on the supply chain (a matter of indifference from an efficiency perspective) and may even benefit consumers in the short term to the
extent that implementers reflect lower input costs in the form of lower pric237
es , it raises the concern that licensing fees are being pushed below dynamically efficient levels, which could reduce the R&D incentives of upstream
innovator-firms or compel those firms to adopt less efficient R&Dmonetization structures.

V. The Political Economy of SEPs, FRAND and
Standardization Policy
Scholarly debates over antitrust and IP policy concerning standardization processes in ICT markets implicitly assume a benevolent and publiclyinterested regulator who seeks to maximize the net welfare gains generated
by innovation activity. Real-world policymakers, however, are exposed to
the efforts of privately interested firms that rationally seek to influence IP
and antitrust policy for individual profit-maximization purposes. The otherwise rich literature on SEPs and the FRAND standard has paid relatively
little attention to the political economic considerations that play a substantial part in real-world lobbying and policymaking on these issues. In this
Part, I undertake the beginnings of such an analysis. Based on evidence re-

236.
The strength of this assumption may merit being revisited to a limited extent, in
light of two developments that are pending as of this writing: (i) a Chinese court’s decision in
December 2018 to grant preliminary injunctive relief to Qualcomm with respect to certain
Apple phones and other devices found to infringe upon Qualcomm’s patents, a decision that is
now being appealed to a higher court, and (ii) a decision in March 2019 by an administrative
judge of the International Trade Commission to issue a limited import exclusion order against
certain Apple devices found to infringe upon a Qualcomm patent, a decision that is subject to
review by the ITC commissioners. See supra note 210-220; supra note 173 and accompanying
text.
237.
This is not a necessary outcome. See discussion infra Part V.C.
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lating to the historical origins of the FRAND requirement and recent SEPrelated enforcement actions by certain competition agencies, I argue that
downstream firms and economies that specialize in the production and assembly of ICT devices have consistently (and with substantial success)
sought to adjust the “IP balance of trade” by advocating for, and sometimes
successfully imposing, limitations on patentees’ ability to seek injunctive
relief and enforce market-negotiated royalty agreements. This incremental
devaluation of IP rights, and the associated IP licensing infrastructure, effectively shifts revenue streams away from firms and economies that specialize
in generating technology inputs and toward firms and economies that specialize in integrating technology inputs into consumption goods. These antitrust enforcement actions are inconsistent with the fundamental objective of
antitrust law, which seeks to preserve the conditions under which the price
discovery mechanism can allocate resources efficiently, rather than influencing the price mechanism to favor certain constituencies. While an enforcement strategy targeting SEPs operates to the private interest of licensees (and economies that are principally populated by licensees), there is
considerable doubt whether it is consistent with a broader public interest in
preserving the vertically disaggregated structure, and cooperative standardization mechanisms, that have supported innovation and commercialization
in wireless communication markets.

A. The Origins of the FRAND Requirement
The FRAND requirement is typically presented as an instrument for
shielding licensees, and as a result consumers, from the pricing power of patent holders after a technology standard has been widely adopted. This objective aligns with the private interests of implementer firms in reducing
their input costs and, to the extent that implementers pass on any resulting
cost-savings, is compatible with at least the short-term interest of consumers. Without excluding the latter possibility (although, contrary to theoreti238
cal assumptions, recent empirical findings discussed above suggest that
patentees exert limited pricing power in smartphone markets), the historical
origins of the FRAND requirement in wireless communications markets
cast doubt on the purpose conventionally attributed to this requirement and
related policy actions commonly characterized as measures to protect
against opportunism by patent owners. Rather, those origins suggest that the
FRAND requirement was at least initially deployed as part of a protectionist
strategy to reduce the input costs, and perpetuate the dominant position, of
national European telecommunications carriers.
Some background is helpful. Historically, European telecommunications markets had been dominated by legally recognized or government-

238.

See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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controlled national telecommunications monopolies (akin to the role of
AT&T, which enjoyed a legally recognized monopoly in national telephone
service in the U.S. market until its break-up in 1982), which in turn maintained standing relationships with local “national champion” equipment
239
suppliers. It had been common practice for telecom standard-setting bodies to provide that patent holders would license to all interested parties on
“reasonable” terms, which were left unspecified on the understanding that
the precise meaning would be established through case-by-case negotia240
tion. In general, patent-related issues do not appear to have been a key
concern, as illustrated by the fact that neither the telephone carriers nor
equipment suppliers in the European telecom markets were especially active
241
in obtaining, licensing, or litigating patents. This is most likely attributable to the fact that both the national carriers and equipment suppliers operated in sheltered markets, and, therefore, did not require IP rights to protect
against competitive entry.
In 1987, the European Union created the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”) in order to form a standard-setting entity
for wireless communications that reflected a range of constituencies, rather
242
than only the national telephone carriers. Reflecting this view, one author
writes that “ETSI removed European telecommunication standardization
from the domain of confidential agreements struck between monopoly net243
work operators and their preferred suppliers.” Nonetheless, the monopoly
carriers did not easily yield to the new paradigm, taking steps to perpetuate
244
the existing weak-IP and entry-protected environment. In 1992-93, ETSI
245
adopted, on an interim basis, a “licensing by default” standard that included three key components largely favorable to licensees. These included: (i)
239.
See RUDI BEKKERS, MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS: GSM, UMTS,
TETRA AND ERMES 223 (2001); Eric J. Iversen, Standardization and Intellectual Property
Rights: ETSI’s Controversial Search for New IPR-Procedures, in THE STANDARDS EDGE 298
(Sherrie Bolin ed., 2002) [hereinafter Iversen, ETSI]; Eric J. Iversen, Standardization and Intellectual Property Rights: Conflicts Between Innovation and Diffusion in New Telecommunication Systems, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS AND STANDARDIZATION: A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 80, 83 (Meehdi Khosrowpour et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Iversen,
Standardization].
240.
See Rudi Bekkers & Isabelle Liotard, European Standards for Mobile Communications: The Tense Relationship Between Standards and Intellectual Property Rights, 3 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 110, 119-20 (1999).
241.
See Iversen, Standardization, supra note 227, at 94-95.
242.
See Bekkers & Liotard, supra note 228, at 112; Iversen, ETSI, supra note 227, at
299.
243.
See Richard W. Hawkins, Standards-Making as Technological Diplomacy: Assessing Objectives and Methodologies in Standards Institutions, in STANDARDS, INNOVATION
AND COMPETITIVENESS: THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF STANDARDS IN NATURAL AND
TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENTS 147, 154 (Richard W. Hawkins, et al. eds., 1995).
244.
See Brooks & Geradin, supra note 132, at 17-18.
245.
See Bekkers & Liotard, supra note 228, at 120-21; Brooks & Geradin, supra note
132, at 17-18; Iversen, ETSI, supra note 227, at 302-04.
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IP holders would agree to license all patents deemed essential to the standard on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, subject to a maximum royalty rate; (ii) an IP holder could not refuse a license to a SEP unless it had
given timely notice to ETSI during the standard development process; and
(iii) IP holders could not seek injunctive relief when enforcing an “essen246
tial” patent. This policy was dissatisfactory to IP owners—especially
Motorola, which held the largest portfolio of patents relating to the GSM
247
standard and had previously resisted a collective agreement by European
248
carriers to require royalty-free licensing. In 1993, the Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association, a U.S. trade association, filed a
complaint with the European competition agency alleging that elements of
249
the modified policy were anticompetitive. In 1994, ETSI abandoned its
policy in favor of an approach that only required IP holders to commit to
FRAND licensing and to disclose all essential IP rights during the standard250
ization process —essentially, the customary principles that govern standard-setting in wireless telecommunications to this day.
At its inception, the FRAND requirement emerged out of an intensive
effort to preserve a “pre-wireless” status quo in which dominant national
carriers and local equipment champions were largely protected from entry,
and, as a result, firms generally invested few resources in obtaining, litigating, or licensing patents. These historical origins stand in contrast to the typical characterization of the FRAND requirement as an instrument by which
to protect intermediate users against opportunistic conduct by upstream patent holders. At least at its origins, the FRAND requirement effectively operated as an instrument by which a downstream buyer monopsony consisting of national monopoly carriers sought to reduce the royalties owing to
upstream innovators (in particular, Motorola) that were not part of the group
of national carriers and equipment suppliers that had dominated European
national telecom markets. Approximately the same strategy is consistent
with subsequent lobbying activity leading to European antitrust enforcement

246.
Bekkers and Liotard, supra note 240, at 121; Bekkers et al., supra note 29, at 181;
Sidak, Injunctive Relief, supra note 182, at 391; Iversen, ETSI, supra note 239, at 302-04.
247.
See Iversen, Standardization, supra note 241, at 94.
248.
See GARRY A. GARRARD, CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS: WORLDWIDE MARKET
DEVELOPMENT 140 (1998); Jorge L. Contreras, Origins of FRAND Licensing Commitments in
the United States and Europe, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL
STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 164-65 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018). On the agreement among European carriers, see Iversen, Standardization, supra note 241, at 93.
249.
See Bekkers et al., supra note 29, at 181; Brooks & Geradin, supra note 135, at 9;
Iversen, ETSI, supra note 239, at 303-05.
250.
See Bekkers & Liotard, supra note 240, at 122; Brooks & Geradin, supra note 135,
at 9; Iversen, ETSI, supra note 239, at 307-08. For these elements in the current policy, see
EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS INSTITUTE, ETSI INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS POLICY 37 (VERSION 37).
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actions against Qualcomm, the leading technology contributor to the 3G
wireless standard, which relied on its patent portfolio to challenge U.S. and
European telecom carriers that had adopted what was later shown to be the
251
technically inferior TDMA/GSM standard. In 2007, the European Commission initiated an antitrust enforcement action against Qualcomm, following a formal complaint filed in 2005 with the Commission by Broadcom,
Ericsson, NEC, Nokia, Panasonic, and Texas Instruments. Those firms, all
252
of which were licensees of Qualcomm’s CDMA chip technology , claimed
that Qualcomm’s licensing practices were inconsistent with its FRAND
253
commitment and would impede the rollout of the 3G wireless network.
After four years, the Commission closed the investigation into Qual254
comm , following a settlement agreement between Qualcomm and
255
Nokia. Contrary to the dire predictions of the carriers and device manufacturers, the 3G wireless network was nonetheless widely adopted across a
256
broad range of consumer income segments , suggesting that royalty rates
did not reach the “exorbitant” levels that had been predicted. As discussed
previously, empirical evidence confirms this implication, showing that royalty rates in the 3G and 4G smartphone markets have generally constituted
257
no more than single-digit percentages of the device’s sale price.

B. SEPs, Antitrust Policy and the IP Balance of Trade
Policy positions expressed by firms with respect to the treatment of
SEPs and the FRAND commitment under antitrust and patent law align
closely with firms’ position on the industry supply chain. As I have shown
258
elsewhere, the policy preferences expressed in amicus briefs filed in SEPrelated litigation demonstrate a consistent pattern: net technology users that
specialize in production, distribution and other implementation activities
tend to favor weaker enforcement of SEPs and stricter construction of the
FRAND commitment; approximately the opposite policy positions are expressed by net technology producers that specialize in R&D. This same divergence can be observed at the “country level” among jurisdictions that are
populated principally by firms that specialize in the implementation func251.
See Bekkers & West, supra note 94, at 81-82, 85, 90-91.
252.
See Geradin, What’s Wrong with Royalties, supra note 138, at 463 n.6.
253.
See BJORN LUNDQVIST, STANDARDIZATION UNDER EU COMPETITION RULES AND
US ANTITRUST LAWS: THE RISE AND LIMITS OF SELF-REGULATION 64-65 (2014); Geradin &
Rato, supra note 119, at 106, 122.
254.
See Adam Cohen, European Commission Closes Qualcomm Investigation, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 25, 2009.
255.
See LUNDQVIST, supra note 241; Don Clark, Qualcomm, Nokia Reach Deal to End
Fight Over Patents, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2008. As part of the settlement, Nokia withdrew its
complaint with the European antitrust commission.
256.
See Iversen, Standardization, supra note 241, at 95-96.
257.
See supra note 155.
258.
See Barnett, Has the Academy, supra note 14, at 1373-75.
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tions of the technology supply chain. Antitrust policies pursued in certain
Asian jurisdictions with respect to SEPs reflect sensitivity to the input costs
borne by local device manufacturers, which are generally net technology
users in the global supply chain and typically assert that the licensing fees
259
paid to IP holders are “excessive.” As noted by former FTC Chairman
Maureen Ohlhausen antitrust enforcers in these jurisdictions appear to use
antitrust law (specifically, the “abuse of dominance” principle that extends
beyond “monopolization” offenses as understood in U.S. antitrust law) to
take action against what are perceived to be “‘unfairly’ high prices” or, in
260
the IP context, excessively high royalty fees. With respect specifically to
SEP licensing markets, antitrust authorities in China, South Korea, and
Taiwan have pursued actions resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in
fines and, in some cases, settlements reducing the royalty rates under which
Qualcomm licenses its patented technologies for use in CDMA-based 3G
261
and 4G (and now 5G) devices and networks. The Table below summarizes these enforcement actions and remedies, as well as contemporaneous enforcement actions taken by European and U.S. antitrust regulators, concerning Qualcomm’s licensing practices.

259.
A statement made by an executive at Xiaomi, a leading Chinese handset maker,
illustrates this perspective. In an interview with a journalist, the executive bemoans the licensing fees that Chinese firms must pay to foreign SEP owners: “(1) I pay but others don’t pay
(2) I pay a higher rate than others (3) the rate is too expensive to afford.” Quoted in Joff Wild,
Licensors must understand that what is FRAND in US and EU may not be in China, says Xiaomi IP strategy chief, IAM-MEDIA.COM, http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=
18521233-ec1e-4e90-9af0-a9b57de41504 (last visited Jan. 9, 2017).
260.
OHLHAUSEN, supra note 179, at 93.
261.
On the Korean enforcement actions, see S. Korea fines Qualcomm $208 mln in anti-trust case, REUTERS, (July 23, 2009, 4:42 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/qualcommkorea/update-2-s-korea-fines-qualcomm-208-mln-in-anti-trust-caseidUSSEO19318620090723, and Se Young Lee & Stephen Nellis, South Korea fines Qualcomm $854 million for violating competition laws, REUTERS (Dec. 27, 2016, 10:06 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-antitrust-idUSKBN14H062?il=0; for the Chinese enforcement action, see Paul Mozur and Quentin Hardy, China Hits Qualcomm with Fine, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/10/business/international/
qualcomm-fine-china-antitrust-investigation.html; and for the Taiwanese enforcement action,
see Qualcomm Fined Record $773 Million in Taiwan Antitrust Probe, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11,
2017, 7:41 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-11/qualcomm-fined773-million-in-taiwan-for-antitrust-violations.
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TABLE 5: MAJOR ANTITRUST ACTIONS CONCERNING QUALCOMM
LICENSING PRACTICES (2009-2018)
262

LEGAL
AUTHORITY

FINE/REMEDY

2009

KFTC (Korea)

$243M (reduced
265
to $200M)

2009

JFTC (Japan)
NDRC
(China)

Behavioral

YEAR

2015

266

$975M; reduced
267
royalty rates

MAJOR LOCAL
DEVICE
MAKERS/
263
LICENSEES
Samsung, LG

COUNTRY’S
IP BALANCE
264
OF TRADE

Sony, Sharp

+$4.86B

Huawei, Oppo,
Vivo, Xiaomi,
ZTE

-$20.9B

-$4.1B

262.
The year denotes the year in which the fine or other remedy was issued. In the case
of the FTC action, which is still pending, it denotes the year in which the enforcement action
was commenced.
263.
Qualcomm Technology Licensing, QUALCOMM.COM, https://www.qualcomm.com/
invention/licensing (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
264.
All figures represent the IP “balance of payments” as of the year indicated in the
Table (or the nearest year for which data is available). The calculations are based on (except
for Taiwan): THE WORLD BANK, DATA, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
BX.GSR.ROYL.CD and https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BM.GSR.ROYL.CD. The
World Bank figures are in current dollars and measure all payments made, or received, for the
use of intellectual property rights. Data for Taiwan (which may be underestimated) was
sourced from OECD. Main Science and Technology Indicators, OECD: STATS,
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MSTI_PUB.
265.
South Korean watchdog cuts fine on Qualcomm after decade-old legal battles,
REUTERS, Mar. 20, 2019.
266.
See Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Commission, Cease and Desist Order Against
Qualcomm Inc [sic] orporated (Sept. 30, 2009), https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/
yearly-2009/sep/individual-000038.html.
267.
Qualcomm Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 9, 2015) (describing fine, settlement and resolution of investigation with China competition authority). Qualcomm also
agreed to the following reduction in the royalty rates charged to local device manufacturers:
“For licenses of Qualcomm’s 3G and 4G essential Chinese patents for branded devices sold
for use in China, Qualcomm will charge royalties of 5% for 3G devices (including multimode
3G/4G devices) and 3.5% for 4G devices (including 3-mode LTETDD devices) that do not
implement CDMA or WCDMA, in each case using a royalty base of 65% of the net selling
price of the device.” See id., at Exhibit 99.1.
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YEAR

LEGAL
AUTHORITY

FINE/REMEDY

2016

KFTC
(Korea)

$868M (under
268
appeal)

2017

TFTC
(Taiwan)

2017

FTC (U.S.)

2018

Euro.
Cmm’n
(EU)

233

MAJOR LOCAL
DEVICE
MAKERS/
LICENSEES
Samsung, LG

COUNTRY’S
IP
BALANCE
OF TRADE
-$2.12B

$778M (reduced
269
to $93M)

HTC

-$4.07B

Various
modifications to
patent licenses
(order expected
270
to be appealed)
$1.2B (under
271
appeal)

Apple

+$79.58B

Nokia, Ericsson

-$64.73B

In the case of China, Korea, and Taiwan, the pattern of antitrust enforcement, hefty fines, and modified licensing terms bears indications of a
protectionist use of competition law to reduce the royalty burden of local
device manufacturers, and, more generally, mitigate the jurisdiction’s nega272
tive IP balance of payments (equal to receipts less payments for IP). Each

268.
It appears that Qualcomm is currently appealing this penalty and decision. See
Qualcomm fends off Korea antitrust woes with Samsung backing, TELECOMREVIEW (Feb. 4,
2018), www.telecomreview.com/index.php/articles/telecom-vendors/2032-qualcomm-fendsoff-korea-antitrust-woes-with-samsung-backing (reporting that Samsung had entered into expanded cross-licensing agreement with Qualcomm and had agreed to withdraw its support for
the Korean antitrust regulator’s suit against Qualcomm).
269.
Yimou Lee & Stephen Nellis, Qualcomm Settles Anti-Trust Case with Taiwan Regulator
for
$93
Million,
REUTERS
(Aug.
9,
2018,
10:14
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-qualcomm-taiwan/qualcomm-settles-anti-trust-casewith-taiwan-regulator-for-93-million-idUSKBN1KV07Z?feedType=RSS&feedName=
businessNews. As part of the settlement, Qualcomm agreed to invest $700 million in Taiwan
over a period of several years. Additionally, it agreed to provide licenses to competing chip
manufacturers, Intel and MediaTek (a Taiwanese corporation), in the event it sought to enforce a patent against those firms.
270.
See Nellis, supra note 5.
271.
Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Fines Qualcomm
€997 Million for Abuse of Dominant Position (Jan. 24, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-18-421_en.htm. Qualcomm has appealed the fine. Qualcomm Asks EU Court to
Scrap $1.2 Billion Fine, REUTERS (June 4, 2018, 1:28 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-eu-qualcomm-antitrust-court/qualcomm-asks-eu-court-to-scrap-1-2-billion-antitrustfine-idUSKCN1J02EO.
272.
Note that I am not addressing decisions by courts in these jurisdictions that relate
specifically to patent law, which may in some cases deviate from the IP-skeptical tendencies
observed in policy statements and enforcement actions pursued by competition regulators in
these countries. In particular, I note the decision in December 2018 by a Chinese court to
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jurisdiction shown in the Table above, with the exception of Japan and the
U.S., has a net IP deficit (that is, the amount paid by domestic to foreign
firms for IP rights exceeded payments received by domestic firms from foreign firms for IP rights), and, in the case of China, Korea, and Taiwan, has
273
one or more major wireless handset device manufacturers. For example,
China had a net IP deficit of $20.9 billion in 2015 and has several major
wireless device manufacturers, which rely on licensing IP from foreign
firms, due either to incomplete patent coverage or lack of sufficient techno274
logical expertise. If Chinese competition law actions with respect to SEPs
are situated within a broader government-sponsored standardization strategy, there are even stronger indications of protectionist motivations. Chinese
authorities have actively promoted the development of Chinese-specific variations on international standards in a broad range of technologies, including
DVD players, audio/visual “codec” standards, local area networking, opti275
mal media storage, cloud computing, and the internet of things. In particular, China invested heavily (and unsuccessfully) in developing alternative
276
“indigenous” standards in wireless communications : (i) the TD-SCDMA
standard, which would have substituted for the dominant W-CDMA standard, and (ii) the “WAPI” standard, which would have substituted for the
277
dominant WiFi standard. These domestic standards are typically launched
together with IP policies that mandate or encourage royalty-free or nominal-

grant limited injunctive relief to Qualcomm with respect to certain Apple phones and other
devices found to infringe upon Qualcomm’s patents. See supra note 220.
273.
The Japanese and European firms listed in the Table above are licensees of Qualcomm but have either withdrawn from, or do not have a substantial share in, the worldwide
smartphone production market. See Smartphone Rankings Shaken Up Once Again as Huawei
Surpasses Apple, INT’L DATA CORP. (July 31, 2018), https://www.idc.com/
getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS44188018.
274.
See DIETER ERNST, CHINA’S STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS CHALLENGE: FROM
LATECOMER TO (ALMOST) EQUAL PLAYER 22 (Centre for International Governance Innovation ed., 2017).
275.
See generally Michael Murphree & Dan Breznitz, Standards, Patents and National
Competitiveness, 40 GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE 2, 7-8, 14, 21 (2016);
STEPHEN J. EZELL & ROBERT D. ATKINSON, THE MIDDLE KINGDOM GALAPAGOS ISLAND
SYNDROME: THE CUL-DE-SAC OF CHINESE TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS 13 ( Information
Technology & Innovation Foundation ed., 2014); DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL MURPHREE,
U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. COMM’N, THE RISE OF CHINA IN TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS:
NEW NORMS IN OLD INSTITUTIONS (2013); SCOTT KENNEDY, RICHARD P. STUTTMEIER &
JUN SU, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., STANDARDS, STAKEHOLDERS AND INNOVATION:
CHINA’S EVOLVING ROLE IN THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, NBER SPECIAL REPORT
#15 21-25 (2008); Scott Kennedy, The Political Economy of Standards Coalitions: Explaining
China’s Involvement in High-Tech Standards Wars, 2 ASIA POLICY 41 (2006).
276.
China: Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and Indigenous Innovation Policies on the U.S. Economy, Inv. No. 332-519, USITC Pub. 4266 (May 2011) (Final), at 5-24.
277.
Id. at 5-22 to 5-24. On the WAPI standard, see Ping Gao, WAPI: A Chinese Attempt
to Establish Wireless Standards and the International Coalition that Resisted, 23 COMM. OF
THE ASSOC. FOR INFO. SYS. 151 (2008).
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278

royalty licensing , and, as formalized in recent amendments to the Standardization Law of the People’s Republic of China, require the exclusive or
279
mostly exclusive use of technology owned by Chinese firms. The strategy
is clear. By developing standards that are not reliant on foreign-owned IP
and launching those standards subject to IP policies that mandate or encour280
age royalty-free or nominal-royalty licensing, local manufacturers’ royalty
281
fees payable to foreign IP holders can be reduced, export margins can be
282
improved, and foreign entrants may be compelled to adopt the Chinese
283
standard, which could then promote adoption in non-Chinese markets.
While these efforts have largely been unsuccessful (due, in several cases, to
the lack of technological equivalence leading to underadoption by the do284
285
mestic market), often are unable to avoid using foreign IP, and have
286
never led to international adoption, they illustrate the political-economic
motivations that may at least partially drive competition law policy actions
by Chinese regulators on SEP/FRAND issues.

C. Do Consumers Always Benefit from Reduced Input Costs?
It might be argued that competition law enforcement actions that limit
the pricing power of IP licensors nonetheless promote consumer interests (at
See BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, supra note 262, at 3, 33-34.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION
INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF
1974 (2018), at 181. These amendments appear to track existing policies described by other
commentators. See Murphree & Breznitz, supra note 275, at 7-8, 14; EZELL & ATKINSON,
supra note 262, at 13.
280.
See Murphree & Breznitz, supra note 262, at 7-8.
281.
See BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, supra note 262, at 34; see also USITC, supra note
276, at 5-22 to 5-24.
282.
See, e.g., id. at 2-3 (describing how Chinese standardization policy is designed to
reduce manufacturers’ costs of accessing IP).
283.
Id. at 36; EZELL & ATKINSON, supra note 275, at 14-19. With respect to China’s
development of an alternative to the MPEG audio-video codec standard, the authors write:
“China’s clear intent in developing AVS was to keep Chinese companies from having to pay
high licensing fees to foreign companies and to give them an edge over their American competitors.” Id. at 19. This strategy is not unique to China. In the 1950s, West Germany developed the “PAL” standard specifically in order to avoid having to pay royalties for use of the
“SECAM” standard that prevailed in France and the Soviet Union. See PADILLA ET AL., supra
note 18, at 5.
284.
See EZELL & ATKINSON, supra note 275, at 16 (describing failure of Chinese indigenous 3G technology standard, in competition with superior foreign 3G technologies).
285.
See BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, supra note 275, at 7; KENNEDY, STUTTMEIER & SU,
supra note 275, at 10 (noting that, although China established indigenous wireless communications standard, only 7.3% of the patents in the standard are Chinese-owned).
286.
See EZELL & ATKINSON, supra note 279, at 23; BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, supra
note 275, at 2; Kennedy, supra note 275, at 43. Kennedy describes in particular China’s failed
to attempt to develop a competing indigenous standard to the international WiFi standard. Id.
at 48-56.
278.
279.
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least in the short term) by promoting reduced retail prices for end-users that
purchase the products and services embodying the licensors’ technology.
But there is no assurance that this will occur. If the implementer firm holds
a dominant branded position in the retail market, and is therefore substantially protected against entry, then it may have no or little incentive to pass
287
on the cost-savings to consumers. Consistent with this possibility, in the
second quarter of 2018, Apple enjoyed record profits despite having in288
creased prices on its newest model iPhones, while Apple’s principal suppliers and assemblers suffered a revenue decline, reportedly due in part to
289
Apple’s bargaining leverage in renegotiating the fees paid to those firms.
The first development—an increase in Apple’s profits concurrently with an
increase in prices—suggests that Apple enjoyed during this period some degree of pricing power in the retail market, due potentially to brand power,
290
inelastic demand among higher-income consumers (the average price of
an Apple iPhone in 2016 was $690, as compared to $214 for an average
291
Android-compatible phone), and consumers’ switching costs arising from
292
Apple’s “walled garden” ecosystem. The second development—a decline
in suppliers’ revenues—suggests that Apple enjoys buying power in the upstream inputs market, which may account in part for the fact that Apple captures by far the largest portion (42%) of the retail price of each iPhone 7
sold, substantially in excess of the value captured by any other firm in the
293
supply chain. By contrast, all IP licensors collectively captured only about
294
5% of the retail price.
Apple’s bargaining power with respect to upstream input suppliers may
be especially strong in the case of components that Apple (or other distribu287.
For a similar view, see Geradin & Rato, supra note 119, at 106.
288.
See Therese Poletti, Apple Earnings Show Why You Can Expect More $1000
iPhones, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 1, 2018, 10:02 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
apple-earnings-show-why-you-can-expect-more-1000-iphones-2018-07-31.
289.
See Debby Wu, What’s Good for Apple Isn’t Always Best for iPhone Suppliers,
BLOOMBERG (May 1, 2018, 10:24 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0502/what-s-good-for-apple-isn-t-always-good-for-iphone-suppliers.
290.
Mark Sullivan, Apple Bet That We’d Pay More for Phones. It Was Right, FAST
COMPANY (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40525598/apple-bet-that-wed-paymore-for-phones-it-was-right. More recently, it appears that Apple’s pricing on its highest-end
models may have overestimated consumers’ demand for these devices, suggesting that the
market has identified limits to Apple’s pricing power. See Jefferson Graham, Did Apple Retail
Prices Get Too High in 2018? Consumers Say Yes, USA TODAY (Dec. 29, 2018, 11:41 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2018/12/29/did-apple-retail-prices-get-toohigh-2018-consumers-say-way-yes/2432445002/.
291.
E.g., Dedrick & Kraemer, supra note 84, at 6 (citing IDC data).
292.
On Apple’s “walled garden” strategy, see Thomas W. Hazlett, David Teece and
Leonard Waverman, Walled Garden Rivalry: The Creation of Mobile Network Ecosystems
(George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 11-50) (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1963427.
293.
Dedrick & Kraemer, supra note 84, at 16-17; WORLD IP REPORT, supra note 18, at
100.
294.
Dedrick & Kraemer, supra note 84, at 17.
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tors that enjoy uniquely branded positions on the supply chain), given its
ample financial and human capital, can credibly source internally or from
competing suppliers. This risk is not theoretical: in 2017, Apple terminated
its relationship with two chip suppliers (while reportedly poaching engineers from both firms), reportedly because it had developed the expertise to
295
produce the chips internally. Given the absence of a credible injunctive
threat as discussed above (or contractual restrictions that may limit a suppli296
er’s ability to bring an infringement suit), even input suppliers with fairly
substantial patent portfolios may have little leverage by which to negotiate
meaningful royalties from a large branded distributor. While this reduces
the producer/distributor firm’s input costs, it is not clear that this would result in any pricing benefit for consumers in the short term and would likely
depress the investment incentives of upstream R&D-specialist firms over a
longer time period.

Conclusion
Conventional wisdom assumes that wireless communications markets
are widely failing at standardization and the government can improve it. In
this paper, I have argued that those markets are widely succeeding at standardization and government intervention risks undermining it. For approximately a decade, antitrust regulators and some courts, supported by large
intermediate users and substantial portions of the scholarly community,
have adopted the view that patent-intensive ICT markets suffer from endemic market failure, which in turn invites regulatory intervention to “protect”
against overreaching by patent licensors. Yet empirical inquiry and several
decades of market performance suggest otherwise. In particular, the explosive growth of the wireless communications markets—characterized by declining (quality-adjusted) prices, expanding output, and continuous innovation—has relied on an overlooked institutional infrastructure largely

295.
These companies included Imagination Technologies (a supplier of graphics processing units, see Paul Sandle, Imagination Technologies’ Shares Plunge 70 Percent After
Apple Ditches Firm, REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2017, 2:40 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usimagntn-tchnlgs-apple-idUSKBN1750HR; and Dialog (a supplier of a power management
integrated circuit), see Eric Auchard & Harro Ten Wolde, Apple May Ditch Dialog, Analyst
Says, Hitting Chipmakers’ Shares, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2017, 4:54 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dialog-apple/apple-may-ditch-dialog-analyst-says-hittingchipmakers-shares-idUSKBN17D0VF.
296.
This was apparently the case with respect to Imagination Technologies, a supplier
of graphics chipsets to Apple, which terminated the supply relationship when it elected to design and produce the chipsets internally. The supplier was bound by a dispute resolution
agreement that apparently limited its’ ability to bring a patent infringement claim in court. See
Ben Lovejoy, Apple’s Supplier Battles Intensify as Imagination Technologies Files Formal
Dispute, 9TO5MAC (May 4, 2017, 3:54 AM), https://9to5mac.com/2017/05/04/imaginationtechnologies-apple-dispute-resolution-procedure/.

238

Michigan Technology Law Review

[Vol. 25:163

assembled by market actors and reliant on the two key legal inputs of secure
IP rights and contract enforcement. Leading contributors to the 3G and 4G
markets have demonstrated the capacity to deliver standardization outcomes
through cooperative arrangements that likely outperform the alternatives of
government monopoly, which is subject to informational deficits and regulatory capture, and private monopoly, which triggers the risk of pricing and
other distortions inherent to protected dominant positions. That marketdriven standardization process has relied on reasonably secure property
rights, quasi-contractual licensing commitments supplemented by reputational discipline, and targeted application of antitrust safeguards against collusion risk. The international policy trajectory in SEP markets not only
threatens that mix but rewards implementer firms and jurisdictions that seek
to shift the “IP balance of trade” by lobbying for policy actions that reduce
those firms’ and jurisdictions’ input costs but endanger the viability of
R&D-specialist entities and cooperative standardization arrangements that
have promoted innovation and commercialization in wireless communications markets.

